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The Rate of Return in German Manufacturing Industry
Horst Albach
A. The Problem
Economic development in the industrialized countries is in
a vicious circle. In order to master the problems of economic
change, of unemployment, and of declining productivity, the
economies need risk capital. However, the returns on risk
capital seem to decline steadily. Thus it becomes less and
less attractive for private and institutional investors to
hold equity. The firms resort to credit financing of invest-
ments in fixed assets, and the banking institutions develop
new forms of industrial credit and of leasing of equipment
to meet the rising demand for long-term credit financing of
manufacturing industry. Thisof courseincreases financial
risk of equity holders. The risk-premium on equity capital
rises. The declining returns on equity prove less and less
adequate to cover the risk premia. Share prices decline
consequently.
Economic policy has in the past tried to break this vicious
circle by shifting part of the business risk to the govern-
ment. Investment incentives, fast tax right-offs, loss carry
backs as well as government subsidies for R & D-outlay are
all intended to share the business risk incurred by the firms'
investment in plant and equipment. The governments' share
in business risk is, of course, the higher, the higher the
tax-rate is. High tax-rates on the other hand reduce the
returns from successful business ventures. If government
participation in the losses is not adequate to offset the
losses in returns from government participation in the profits,
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then clearly the firms will tend to reduce business risk.
There are two ways for companies to reduce business risk:
by diversification and by shifting investment to less risky
assets. Diversification is achieved by growing inside and in
market-share, changing the structure of the business portfolio
leads to a decreasing ratio of fixed assets to capital in-
vested and to a higher proportion of liquid assets.
In this paper we will show that
1. the rate of return on total capital
has declined. This is explained by increased
competition and decreasing business risk,
2. the rate of return on equity has declined.
The reduction in business risk could account
for this development if financial risk had
remained constant. However,
3. financial risk has increased. Rising interest
rates on debt-capital and increasing debt-equity-
ratios are evidence of this fact.
The resulting paradox of equity finance may be explained by
hidden returns on equity. There are various forms of such
returns. Agency cost is one, government subsidies for the
acquisition of equity by private investors is another
and convertible bonds which tie high interest rates on the
bonds to ownership of equity is still another.
B. The Methodology
The following empirical analyses of the hypotheses advanced
will be based on data of German manufacturing firms from
various sources. The sources will be explained in the first
paragraph of this section. In the second paragraph we will
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shortly comment on the statistical methods used to analyze
the data.
I. The Data Banks
There are many sources of information on the profitability
of German manufacturing corporations. However, there are no
national accounts available for Germany that cover the entire
manufacturing sector and provide data on the profitability
of manufacturing industry in the detailed form that was felt
necessary in order to make international comparisons possible.
All the data available are derived from company financial reports.
There are basically five major sources of information:
- the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches
Bundesamt)
- the Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank)
- the Association of Savings Banks
(Sparkassen- und Giroverband)
- the Industrial Credit Bank (Industriekredit-
bank AG Deutsche Industriebank)
- the Bonn Sample (Bonner Stichprobe)
The Association of Savings-Banks and the Industrial Credit
Bank do not collect the material in a form that lends itself
easily to statistical analyses. The firms covered vary
from year to year and the composition of the sample depends
on whether there are client relationships with these instit-
utions or not. The Central Bank uses the financial reports
of all the firms that have to file reports with it because
directly or indirectly they do business with the Central Bank.
These firms vary annually. The financial reports are either
tax-returns or financial reports published by corporations.
The valuation and reporting standards of these two sources
of information differ widely. For reasons 0f cofieilt
1)
the Central Bank publishes aggregate data only
-4 -
- 4 -
Thus there remain just two sources of data for the analysis
of trend in the profitability of German manufacturing firms.
The data banks of the Federal S.tatistical Office and of the
Business Economics Institute of Bonn University contain the
data of the annual financial reports of German corporations.
There are 373 (1977) German corporations in manufacturing
industry. They represent about 3o% of total employment and about
45% of total sales in manufacturing. Small and medium sized
companies do not have to publish financial reports. Their
tax returns are not available for analysis. We have to assume
that the financial reports of German manufacturing corporations
reflect adequately trends in the development of all the manu-
facturing firms. However, caution is required in the interpret-
ation of the level of profits.
The data of the Federal Statistical Office are published annually
in the Statistical Yearbook2) . We have also used the cost of
living-index and data from the national accounts published
by the Federal Statistical Office.
The capital market statistics used in the analysis were taken
from sources published by the Central Bank. In particular
we used the index of share prices as computed by the Central
Bank3 .
The Bonn Sample is a collection of financial reports at the
Business Economics Institute of Bonn University. At present
222 industrial corporations are covered by the Bonn Sample.
Individual data are available for the years from 1961 through
1979. Information not available from the financial reports
is taken from newspapers and other sources. In particular,
stock prices of the companies in the Bonn Sample are taken
from stock exchange publications.
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II. The Data
The Data of the Federal Statistical Office as well as those
of the Bonn Sample are from financial reports which are pub-
lished annually according to German corporation law. Two
major revisions of publication requirements were put into effect
in the Corporation Act of 1959 and the Corporation Act of 1965.
Until 1959 corporations were not required to publish sales.
They reported sales net of purchases of raw-materials. This
is the reason why we limit the present analysis to years
beginning in 1961, the first year for which the new public-
ation requirements became effective.
The Corporation Act of 1965 brought significant changes in the
standards of valuation. Strict rules for evaluation of de-
preciation allowances and of inventories were passed. They
stressed the principle of consistency as well as the principle
of cautiously reporting equity in profits. Thus: BASF corp-
oration states in its 1979 annual report that equity would
be higher by 4o% if SEC-rules had been applied instead of
German valuation standards. Historical cost reporting prevails
throughout. The valuation of inventories is based on moving
averages. Lifo and Fifo are ndt illegal under the Corporation
Act, it is true, but canrt be used for taxation purposes. Therefore,
on the whole corporations use the same valuation method for
inventories in published financial reports as in their tax
returns.
The definitions of capital and profits are based on the format
of the balance sheet as prescribed by German law. The appendix
gives details. They follow as closely as accounting laws that
differ from country to country permit the conventions that
were agreed upon by the group. The definition of risk will
be given in the relevant section of this paper.
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The Federal Statistical Office publishes aggregate data.
The individual entries in the financial reports are summed
to give the total entry. Ratios are derived from aggregate
data. They are therefore weighted averages. The Bonn Sample
contains data of the individual firms. We prefer to compute
ratios for the sample as a whole as averages of firm ratios.
We thus have unweighted averages. However, weighted averages
are given also to make comparison with the data of the Federal
Statistical Office possible.
Real data were computed from the nominal data. Inflation
accounting has a long history in German accounting theory
dating back to the early twenties. The method used here
applies replacement cost indices to individual items in the
balance sheet and takes estimates of useful livetimes of
equipment into account in arriving at current cost valuation.
Details of the method used are given in a paper submitted to
4)
the group by Koll . The same method is used for nominal data
of the Federal Statistical Office as well as for the data
in the Bonn Sample.
III. The Methods of Analysis
We are interested in the development of the rate of return
of German manufacturing industry. The development is best
described by the time series of annual data. We consider
these time series to be the raw material from which further
hypotheses about trends can be derived. The time series based
on the data of the Federal Staistical Office cover all
corporations (without financial institutions such as banks
and insurance companies). They cover the period from 1961 to
1977.
-1-
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The time series of the Bonn Sample cover the period
from 1961 to 1979. For a small subsample of corporation-
data of the nominal rate of return on equity are available
5)from 1952 to 196o as well .The data of the 222 industrial
corporations in the Bonn Sample are broken up as follows
Table 1-: Firms in the Bonn Sample
Branches of Industry Number of Firms in Sample
Automobile Industry 6
Electrotechnical 11
Industry
Iron and Steel 9
Industry
Chemical Industry 21
Machinery Industry 28
Rest 147
Total 222
While the aggregate time series of the Federal Statistical
Office permit ordinary regression analyses only, pooled
regression methods are used in the analysis of the firm
data in the Bonn Sample. Ordinary least squares estimates
with dummy variables for the individual firms have proved
to be very efficient in studying the financial data. This
method will therefore be used throughout. We use this method
for single equation multiple regressions as well as for the
estimates of a multi-equation model of the development of
the "representative manufacturing firm". This model will then
be used for simulation runs which permit a better insight in
the determinans of the profitability of German manufacturing
- 8 -
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corporations and its development.over time.
C. The Results
I. The Time Series
1. The Return on Capital
1.1. The Nominal Rate of Return on Capital
The nominal rate of return in the German manufacturing sector
shows a marked decline over the years from 1961 to 1979
(Table 2). Profitability of total capital invested in all
manufacturing corporations dropped by roughly 2o% during the
two decades.
Three points merit additional emphasis. The weighted time
series show a less marked decline of profitability than the
unweighted figures. The bigger corporations have obviously
been in a better position to defend their profitability than
the smaller corporations. While the weighted data convey
the impression of a rather gradual erosion of profitability
the unweighted figures show more clearly that the environment,
the corporations find themselves in in the seventies is rather
different from the environment of the sixties. It will be
shown that the oil-price hikes, the currency system of floating
exchange rates and a more aggressive wages policy on the side
of the trade unions are the main features that account for this
difference. Finally, the overall averages hide significant
industry differences. The chemical industries suffered severely
from intensified international competition after the period
of fixed exchange rates ended. The steel industry is hard hit
by cyclical fluctuations as well as by growing structural
problems. The corporations in the machinery industry which
is basically an industry with medium sized firms that do not
Nominal Rate of Return on Capital before Taxes
Year All Corporations Sample
All Corporations Automobile Electro Steel Chemical Machinery
technical
weighted unweighted
1961 9.39 11.88 12.48 12.68 1o.o8 1o.49 13.88 9.31
1962 8.94 - 11.88 12.11 16.14 9.28 7.62 13.54 1o.42
1963 8.91 12.o3 12.2o 15.28 9.69 8.26 14.59 1o.86
1964 9.38 12.75 12.37 14.84 1o.85 8.93 14.38 9.90
1965 9.12 11.36 11.4o 13.67 10.93 6.62 14.o8 8.44
1966 8.32 10.52 1o.64 12.31 9.96 7.91 12.94 6.63
1967 7.94 9.6o 1o.o8 lo.28 lo.36 4.77 11.94 7.64
1968 8.87 11.23 1o.22 12.97 9.44 6.42 13.63 6.79
1969 8.78 11.11 9.89 12.73 9.68 8.85 11.89 6.89
1970 8.48 9.35 9.54 9.o6 10.01 11.01 8.97 5.75
1971 6.97 7.64 9.09 7.64 8.11 4.54 9.4o 7.26
1972 7.41 8.73 9.02 12.39 8.89 4.14 9.90 6.77
1973 7.99 9.39 8.67 11.53 8.68 5.44 9.88 6.4o
1974 7.33 7.74 8.18 3.59 6.24 8.86 9.45 6.51
1975 6.41 7.53 7.67 9.78 6.55 7.72 7.o6 5.86
1976 7.9o 9.97 8.49 15.42 6.65 6.33 7.22 6.15
1977 7.15 9.47 7.71 16.55 6.19 6.38 7.79 5.96
1978 - 9.19 7.55 16.53 5.o2 5.75 8.45 5.78
1979 lo.31 7.49 16.12 5.23 5.46 8.24 4.92
Table 2:
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publish financial accounts seem to have lost ground gradually
against the more flexible smaller-sized firms. The automobile
industry shows a remarkable come-back in the late seventies
after the bad years that followed the oil-nrice-increase in
1973 and the revaluation of the deutschmark in the early
seventies.
We now look at the return on capital invested after taxes.
The effective tax rate has varied considerably over time.
This is partly due to changing tax laws, partly, however,
to the fact that only part of the taxes varies with business
income, while the other is levied on business property and
fixed assets but has to be payed from firm income.
Table 3 gives the effective tax rates and the total return
after taxes for the non-financial corporations and the manu-
facturing companies. We note that the manufacturing corporations
show a higher return than the non-financial corporations despite
a higher effective tax rate. We also note that the larger
companies are more profitable than the smaller ones. Taxation
does not change the overall picture of the rate of return
before taxes.
4"
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Table 3: Nominal Rate of Return on Total Capital after Taxes
Year Non-Financial Corporations Manufacturing Companies
Effective Rate of Effective Rate of Return
Tax-Rate Return Tax -Rate weichted unweighted
1961 .42 4.39 .48 5.68 5.51
1962 .43 4.29 .48 5.72 5.42
1963 .4o 4.46 .46 6.o4 5.48
1964 .4o 4.64 .5o 6.18 5.38
1965 .36 5.o3 .46 6.o6 5.75
1966 .34 4.85 .43 5.96 5.78
1967 .31 4.78 .35 5.96 5.27
1968 .35 4.94 .36 6.19 5.29
1969 .37 4.92 .43 6.24 5.23
1970 .33 5.42 .46 6.26 5.18
1971 .37 4.36 .48 4.91 4.88
1972 .39 4.35 .51 5.o2 4.54
1973 .36 4.89 .55 5.45 4.74
1974 .39 4.42 .56 4.o6 4.51
1975 .43 3.74 .52 4.2o 3.92
1976 .38 4.75 .54 5.71 4.81
1977 .5o 3.49 .57 4.33 3.47
1978 --- ---- .53 4.ol 3.18
1979 --- ---- .64 4.47 3.43
198o - - --- - -- -
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1.2. The Real Rate of Return
Germany has a remarkable record in fighting inflation. There-
fore, the effects of inflation are not predominant in the ana-
lysis of the erosion of profitability of manufacturing com-
panies. However, there should be no question but that inflation
has a negative influence on the rate of return. In particular,
the level of profitability is certainly affected by inflation.
While in the sixties the difference between the real rate and
the nominal rate of return was about 1.5 percent on the basis
of the overall figures after taxes, the difference rose to
two percent in the seventies. The respective differences for
the firms in the Bonn Sample are 2.5 percent and 3 percent.
This means that the purchasing prices of the assets held by the
firms rose faster than the real profits of the corporations.
If the labor unions anticipate the effects of their wage demands
on the cost of living and push for wage increases that cover
not only the rise in productivity but also the anticipated
inflation rate, then clearly the entrepreneurs will try to
pass the wage burden on to their customers, and prices will
rise. However, when at the same time a revaluation of the
currency brings about intensified competition, then it becomes
increasingly difficult to recover all the increase in the wage
bill. Real profits get into a squeeze, while the current cost
of the assets owned by the firms still goes up.
Germany witnessed the first significant revaluation in 1969
and introduced floating exchange rates in 1973. Between 1969
and 1975 the trade unions pushed for a significant change in
the distribution of income with the backing of the newly
established social democratic government. These factors
account for the significant drop in the real rate of profit
on capital invested in the seventies.
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Table 4 shows the development of the real rate of return on capital
before taxes for German manufacturing industry. Profitability was
somewhat higher in manufacturing than in all non-financial
corporations in the sixties while the seventies witness a
definitely smaller gap. The larger companies have recovered
from the set-back caused by the revaluation of the deutsch-
mark somewhat better than the smaller companies.
The recovery of real profitability in the automobile industry
is most remarkable. On the other hand, the dramatic decline
of real profitability in the chemical industry from 12 percent
in the early sixties to 4 percent in the late seventies is
rather appalling. The chemical industry has felt as much as the
steel industry the decline of Germany as an industrial base
for rather unsophisticated products like mass steel and basic
chemical fibres.
The real rate of return on capital after taxes is defined as
the rate of real profits assuming taxation permitted deduction
of current cost devided by real assets at current cost. Of
course, such a figure is purely hypothetical because it
assumes "real" taxation throughout (neither current taxes
on nominal profits nor deferred"taxes on profits of "sale"
of assets at current cost), but may be used as an indicator
for the real interest rate after taxes. Table 5 presents
the raw data for the period from 1961 to 1979.
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Table 4: Real Rate of Return on Capital before Taxes
Year Non-Financial Manufacturing Corporations Branches of Industry
Corporations weighted unweighted Automobile Electro- Steel Chemical Machinery
technical
1961 7.98 9.79 1o.4o 1o.27 8.53 8.82 11.85 7.44
1962 7.o8 9.39 9.67 12.56 7.29 5.86 11.10 8.42
1963 7.13 9.71 9.93 12.25 7.77 6.45 11.92 8.98
1964 7.57 lo.71 9.47 11.53 8.54 6.58 11.99 7.49
1965 7.26 8.81 8.57 1o.54 8.55 5.14 11.64 6.17
1966 6.6o 8.12 7.83 9.68 7.9o 5.71 1o.5o 4.56
1967 6.51 8.25 9.93 9.o8 9.54 3.93 1o.78 6.83
1968 7.26 10.09 9.71 11.65 9.o4 5.34 15.44 6.21
1969 6.95 8.78 7.3o 1o.34 8.o2 6.28 9.2o 5.13
197o 6.15 6.o9 6.)4 5.38 7.16 7.o8 5.45 3.21
1971 4.59 4.26 5.4o 3.65 5.14 1.4o 4.95 4.43
1972 5.o6 5.5o 5.65 8.oo 6.21 1.65 5.15 3.92
1973 5.63 5.15 4.ol 6.38 5.o2 .27 4.82 2.56
1974 4.93 1.73 1.34 - 4.22 .65 2.33 - .39 .51
1975 4.o7 4.15 4.19 5.61 3.75 4.57 2.3o 2.71
1976 5.5o 6.18 4.29 1o.25 3.63 2.78 2.96 2.97
1977 4.94 6.42 4.52 12.13 3.82 3.57 4.35 3.4o
1978 ---- 6.62 4.71 12.73 3.21 3.3o 4.96 3.83
1979- 6.37 3.45 11.o4 .79 2.51 3.52 1.26
1980
Table 5: Real Rate of Return on Capital after Taxes
Year Non-Financial Manufacturing Corporations Branches of Industry
Corporations weighted unweighted Automobile Electro- Steel Chemical Machinery
technical
1961 3.28 3.88 3.82 3.41 3.48 3.58 4.68 2.55
1962 2.83 3.66 3.48 3.85 3.15 2.17 4.36 3.06
1963 3.o7 4.15 3.75 4.65 3.47 2.36 4.70 3.5o
1964 3.24 4.o4 3.17 3.61 3.27 1.66 4.79 2.27
1965 3.55 3.88 3.46 4.16 3.62 1.50 4.68 2.o2
1966 3.43 3.87 3.43 3.86 3.91 3.06 5.o6 1.49
1967 3.58 4.82 4.94 4.93 6.o4 2.06 5.43 3.74
1968 3.66 5.36 5.ol 5.22 5.o9 3.o7 9.26 3.45
1969 3.46 4.22 3.o6 4.37 3.96 3.34 3.79 2.87
197o 3.44 3.25 2.15 1.62 3.73 3.56 1.83 1.13
1971 2.3o 1.79 1.67 .52 2.42 .21 1.11 2.42
1972 2.39 2.15 1.7o 2.53 2.64 .57 1.39 1.65
1973 2.89 1.57 o.43 1.47 1.77 -1.43 .79 .41
1974 2.37 - 1.59 - 2.23 
- 7.oo - 1.92 - .67 - 4.17 - 1.23
1975 1.73 1.15 .69 1.01 1.37 1.79 - .87 .74
1976 2.73 2.33 .9o 3.77 1.o4 .77 - .44 .33
1977 1.73 1.77 .76 2.94 1.27 1.33 .83 .42
1978 ---- 1.90 .87 3.47 1.29 1.2o 1.95 1.16
1979 ---- 1.09 - .11 1.79 - 1.11 .85 .09 - 1.19
198o
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In order to understand the development shown in the first three
columns one has to keep in mind that
- the non-manufacturing companies, particularly
trade and transportation and services, in the
the group of non-financial corporations of
column 1 had significantly higher profits in
1974 than the manufacturing companies.
- obviously the oil-price increase and the end of the
system of Bretton Woods affected the manufacturing
companies earlier and more severely than the non-
producing corporations.
- the smaller companies in the sample of manufacturing
companies have a lower real profitability than the
larger ones. They were affected by the change in the
tconomic climate after 1973 more severely than the
bigger companies.
The most noteworthy developments in the different branches of
industry are
- the chemical industry suffered a severe drop
in real profitability after the revaluation of
the deutschmark in 1969. It has not recovered
from the set-back caused by the revaluation of
the deutschmark yet.
- the automobile industry had a very bad start into
the seventies, but had a remarkable recovery in
the late seventies.
- the figures for the machinery industry may not be
very representative. Particularly in the period
from 1969 on the coefficients of variation consist-
entlv exceed loo percent and in years of recession
they have gone up to almost 6oo percent thus indi-
cating a wide range of profitability of different
firms in this industry.
- 17 -
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1.3. Market Valuation of the Profitability of Capital Invested
When purchasing prices for the real assets of a company rise
faster than profits, then clearly we have a growing divergence
between total current cost of the company and its net present
value derived from the stream of future earnings. If we assume
that the market values companies according to their net present
value, then clearly we would expect the ratio of its market
value to its current cost value to be below 1 and to decline.
This ratio is called Tobin's Q.
Table 6 shows that Tobin's Q has been way below 1 for all
non-financial corporations in Germany ever since 1961. For
the manufacturing companies, however, Tobin's Q was above 1
in the first half of the sixties, around 1 in the late sixties
and early seventies and definitely below 1 since 1974. Since
the nominal rate of return of the companies in the sample was
higher than the rate of return of all non-financial corporations
until about 1969, it should not be surprising that Tobin's Q
is higher for that period. However, since the rate of return
was about the same from 197o onward, a lower Q can only be
attributed to a relatively higher market valuation of the
manufacturing companies per unit of current cost than for all
the non-financial corporations. This would mean that the cost
of capital after taxes should be higher for the non-financial
corporations than for the group of manufacturing firms.
The cost of capital after taxes is defined as profits after
tax plus interest payments devided by the market value of total
capital invested. Table 6 gives the annual figures. In fact, the
cost of capital has been consistently lower for the manufacturing
firms in the sample than for all non-financial corporations.
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Table 6: The Market Valuation of the Rate of Return
Year Non-Financial Corporations Manufacturing Corporations in the Bonn Sample
Cost of Return Tobin's Interest Cost of Return Tobin's Dividend Interest
Capital to Q Rate Capital to Q Rate Rate
after Investors Paid after Investors Paid
Taxes Taxes _
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
19 66
1967
1968
1969
197o
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
198o
4.6 o
4.84
5.04
5.09
5.69
5.73
5.63
5.43
5.26
5.95
4.75
4.61
5.25
4.93
4.05
5.04
3.72
3.94
4.22
4.33
4.27
4.28
4 .49
4.63
4. 3o
4.47
4.72
4.34
3.87
4.54
4.65
3.9o
4.o8
3.37
.64
.57
.57
.58
.57
.55
.55
.59
.62
.61
.6o
.61
.61
.59
.61
.63
.63
2. 4o
2.48
2.63
2.62
2.73
3.oo
3.-16
2.90
2.93
3.47
3.46
3.12
3.67
3.93
3.45
2.89
2.89
3.32
3.91
3. 8o
3.58
4.39
4.8o
4.13
3.88
3.49
3.82
3.62
3.ol
3.44
3.7o
2.77
3.93
2.88
5.14
2.86
2.78
3.25
3.o4
2.93
3.23
3.75
3.36
3.o8
2.85
3.49
3.25
2.66
3.29
3.79
3.o8
2.95
2.69
4.7o
2.63
1.39
1 .09
1.10
1 .09
.97
.86
.95
.99
1.14
1 .01
.99
1.11
1 .05
.92
.94
.92
.91
.49
.91
.8o
.8o
.78
.78
.75
.74
.77
.77
.78
.79
.8o
.78
.82
.84
.8o
.75
.79
.77
.76
t 4 1 4 L - "a "a
2.16
2.32
2.33
2.23
2.47
2.95
2.79
2.44
2.57
3.39
3.23
2.77
3.69
4.21
3.53
2.76
2.73
2.5o
2.57
0-X
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The manufacturing firms' cost of capital has decreased relative
to the non-financial corporations. At the same time, the return
to investors paid by the manufacturing firms increased relative
to the non-financial corporations. The manufacturing firms have
obviously stemmed a decline in the market valuation of their
shares by increasing their dividend rate more than all the
non-financial corporations. Since interest rates actually payed
by the manufacturing firms were, with three exceptions, lower
than those of all the firms, using leverage in order to reduce
the costs of capital may have seemed a promising way to keep
the cost of capital down - if, of course, the equity owners
did not account adequately for the risk involved in such a
policy.
2. The Return on Equity
2.1. The Nominal Rate of Return
The rate of return on equity is first computed as the ratio of
profits after taxes divided by the book-value of equity inclu-
ding reserves. From table 7 we note that the manufacturing
corporations have had a higher rate of return on equity than
the non-financial corporations throughout the period. This is
not in contrast to the picture gained from the data on the
profitability of total capital invested.
However, while the weighted average of the total return is
smaller, the return on equity is higher in the case of the weighted
averages than in the case of the unweighted averages with the
exception of the early seventies. The larger companies have
used leverage to bring about this result.
Table 7: Nominal Rate of Return on Equity
Year All Non-Finan- All Manufacturing Corporations Branches of Industry_
cial Corpor- weighted unweighted Automobile Electro- Steel Chemical Machinery
aLions technical
1961 7.96 11.o8 11.o8 16.62 lo.17 9.69 1o.75 lo.27
1962 7.63 1o.97 lo.84 21.1o 10.10 6.1o 10.64 11.89
1963 7.87 11.76 lo.58 21.2o lo.o7 6.11 11.6o 12.36
1964 8.45 12.18 1o.25 13.33 10.51 5.17 12.1o 1o.34
1965 9.32 11.44 1o.89 13.19 11.78 3.23 12.89 8.99
1966 8.15 lo.32 lo.15 lo.83 11.33 6.17 12.34 7.o3
1967 7.59 lo.23 9.2o 9.41 15.33 .01 9.85 lo.52
1968 8.5o 11.08 9.74 11.o6 11.09 5.57 12.91 9.o5
1969 8.76 11.49 9.76 13.94 11.82 lo.17 10.90 10.72
197o 9.35 1o.82 8.29 9.31 13.34 13.84 6.27 6.89
1971 6.23 6.84 8.34 7.44 9.78 1.o3 7.24 9.67
1972 6.97 8.26 9.o7 13.o3 11.3o .90 8.34 7.45
1973 7.60 8.8o 7.17 12.95 1o.74 3.91 8.46 5.14
1974 5.57 4.55 5.9o 
-4.95 9.90 4.96 8.25 5.2o
1975 4.41 5.73 7.55 7.4o 4.52 5.98 4.31 3.69
1976 9.16 11.48 lo.81 22.25 10.10 4.48 7.94 6.42
1977 4.93 7.53 4.89 16.65 3.88 2.66 5.71 5.39
1978 ---- 6.84 5.36 17.25 1.92 .o2 7.61 4.59
1979 8.75 6.16 16.63 8.1o 1.39 6.92 3.56
1980
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Real Rate of Return on Equity before Taxes
Year Non-Financial Manufacturirq Corporations Gearinq
Corporations weighted unweighted Non-Financial Manufacturing
Corporations Companies
1961 17.o9 21.5o 24.25 2.14 2.2o
1962 14.53 19.85 22.17 2.o5 2.11
1963 14.59 2o.37 21.58 2.o5 2.10
1964 15.67 22.o4 2o.88 2.o7 2.17
1965 14.55 18.33 19.59 2.oo 2.o8
1966 12.29 15.97 16.89 1.86 1.97
1967 11.75 14.9o 16.71 1.50 1.81
1968 13.68 18.85 18.57 1.88 1.87
1969 13.43 17.88 16.oo 1.93 2.o4
197o lo.81 12.15 12.48 1.76 2.oo
1971 7.12 7.47 11.26 1.55 1.75
1972 8.80 1o.92 14.67 1.74 1.99
1973 9.56 11.59 1o.49 1.7o 2.25
1974 7.45 7.28 6.54 1.51 4.21
1975 5.88 7.9o 1o.24 1.44 1.90
1976 1o.46 14.26 11.59 1.90 2.31
1977 8.84 13.56 8.95 1.79 2.11
1978 13.66 8.88 ---- 2.06
1979 15.74 9.49 ---- 2.47
198o
rate of return on equity to real rate
K)
Table 8:
of return on total capital1) Gearing - real
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The 3o largest corporations in the sample increased their debt-
ratio from 1.78 to 2.45 while the 3o smallest corpor-
ations in the sample increased it from 1.27 to 1.94. In the
early seventies the larger firms have obviously had more
difficulty to adjust to a changed and more hostile environment
than the smaller companies. They had a higher share of exports
in their total sales and were thus exposed to the disadvantageous
effects of the revaluation of the deutschmark to a greater extent
than the smaller companies.
Figure 1 adds to the data of table 7 figures on the rate of
return on equity among the 3o smallest and the 3o largest corp-
orations in the sample. It seems interesting to note that the
medium-sized corporations have obviously been quicker to adjust to
the new economic situation than either the largest or the
smallest corporations.
2.2. The Real Rate of Return on Equity
The real rate of return on equity is defined as the ratio of
real profits before taxes divided by the real value of equity.
Table 8 provides the data for the non-financial and for the
manufacturing corporations. It seems that while the smaller
companies have done better in periods of low inflation rates
the larger companies have been in a better position to keep
up with inflation. Of course, they are in a better position
to pass on cost increases to their customers than the smaller
companies.
Gearing is defined as the real rate of return on equity divided
by the real rate of return on total capital. Table 8 shows that
while for all non-financial corporations there was a marked
drop from the early sixties to the early seventies with a
minor recovery only in the late seventies, the manufacturing
corporations seem on the whole to have been able to keep gearing
- 24 -
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virtually at the same level throughout the period.
The problems of defining a real rate of return on equity after
taxes are well-known to financial analysts. We define the real
rate of return on equity as real profits before taxes minus
actual taxes divided by the real value of equity. For detail
the reader is referred to appendix 2. Table 9 presents the
data for the non-financial corporations as well as for the
manufacturing companies in the Bonn Sample. -
It should be interesting to note that since 1971 the real rate
of return on equity after taxes has been lower than the real
rate of return on total capital after taxes for the non-financial
corporations, and that this relation holds true for several years
in the seventies for manufacturing companies as well. Obvious-
ly investment in shares has become a proposition with returns
that are no longer in keeping with the risks involved.
2.3. The Market Valuation of the Return on Equity
While the nominal and the real rates of return reflect current
profits on the current valuation of the firms' assets, the
stock-exchange, of course, reflects the investors' valuation
of the company's future earnings power. It seems interesting
to compare the nominal and the real rates of return with the
market valuation of the return on equity. This ratio is defined
as profits after taxes divided by the market valuation of the
total shares outstanding (excluding preferred stock which is
not treated as credits).
Figure 2 shows the development of the three time-series. The
decline in the nominal and the real rates of return on equity
is not reflected in the market valuation. During the sixties
the market held expectations of growth in earnings. The share-
prices reflected these expectations, and the price-earnings-ratios
- 25 -
Table 9: Real Rate of Return on Equity after Taxes
Manufacturing Companies
Year Non-Financial All Companies Branches of Industry
Corporations weighted unweighted Automobile Electro- Steel Chemical Machinery
technical
1961 5.19 7.45 7.4o 1o.78 7.1o 6.69 7.59 6.ol
1962 4.13 6.66 6.44 11.32 6.05 3.15 6.96 7.42
1963 4.47 7.38 6.53 12.o6 6.o9 3.o5 7.67 7.97
1964 4.92 7.84 5.8o 7.68 6.29 2.25 8.14 5.87
1965 5.47 7.18 6.38 8.35 7.o3 1.81 8.5o 4.69
1966 4.66 6.41 5.76 6.87 7.19 3.44 8.o9 3.23
1967 4.65 7.o9 6.21 6.79 12.o9 - .79 7.55 7.55
1968 5.09 8.23 8.o4 7.98 8.67 3.14 16.85 5.93
1969 4.76 7.23 5.37 9.44 8.o2 5.33 6.12 6.38
1970 4.13 5.23 3.36 3.84 7.53 6.49 1.89 1.32
1971 1.51 1.52 2.39 1.78 3.92 -1.89 1.42 4.o3
1972 2.19 2.87 4.7o 5.99 5.66 -1.13 1.97 2.42
1973 2.59 2.84 1.56 5.91 5.10 .97 1.71 .61
1974 .83 -1.24 - .71 -5.93 3.16 .22 -1.5o - .41
1975 - .10 .36 2.34 1.11 - .34 1.36 -2.28 - .87
1976 3.17 4.55 3.ol 1o.35 1.47 - .28 .94 .24
1977 .49 1.75 - .25 6.29 - .41 -1.29 .74 - .o2
1978 ---- 1.59 .11 7.11 -2.11 -2.67 2.36 .o6
1979 ---- 2.45 .42 6.84 .27 -1.31 .83 - .91
1980
Il
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were high. The market rate of return on equity was below the
real rate of return on equity.
Since
RP(1) RR =
and
NP(2) MR = ,
RR > MR implies
NP(3) Q > T with Tobin's Q defined by
(4) Q ME
The symbols are
RR - real rate of return
RP - real profit
RE - real equity
MR - market rate of profit
NP - nominal profit
ME - market valuation of equity.
Of course, NP/RP > 1 in times of inflation so that (3) certainly
implies Q > 1. When MR > RR, then, of course,
NP
which does not necessarily imply in all instances that Tobin's Q
is smaller than 1. Figure 2 corroborates our previous findings
that relatively speaking Tobin's Q was larger than 1 during the
sixties and smaller than 1 during the seventies. Furthermore,
the gap between the market rate of return and the nominal rate of
return seems to get narrower. This would imply that not only
does the market no longer see a profit potential beyond that
implied by the historical cost of the assets of the companies
but also do investors no longer identify hidden valuation reserves
in the book-values of equity capital.
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2.4. Leverage and the Rate of Return on Equity
It is asserted in the literature on business finance that as
long as the rate of return on total capital is higher than
the interest rate on debt capital, a decrease in the rate of
return on capital invested can be offset by increasing leverage.
Table lo shows that the difference between the rate of return on
capital invested and effective interest rate remains positive
throughout and that the debt-equity-ratio increased over the
period. Thus the gradual decrease in the rate of return on total
capital was partly offset.
However, the difference between the rate of return and the
effective interest rate, the so-called leverage factor, became
smaller and smaller. In order to keep the difference between
the rate of return on equity and the rate of return on total
capital constant, the debt-equity-ratio would have had to be
7.1 instead of 2.2 in 1979. This, of course, was certainly not
feasible. The risks of using leverage to increase the rate of
return on equity become the greater, the more the leverage
factor decreases. This is easily seen when we use the well-known
leverage equation
(6) NRE = NRT + (NRT - EIR)DER
to derive the first differences
(7) ANRE = ANRT + (NRT - EIR)ADER +
(ANRT - AEIR)DER
NRE - nominal rate of return on equity
NRT - nominal rate of return on total capital
EIR - effective interest rate
DER - debt-equity-ratio
A - indicator of annual change
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If the leverage factor in the second summand is small,
additional debt financing does not help to stem the tide
of decreasing profitability of total capital. On the other hand,
if interest rates rise due to rising inflation and the profitab-
ility of capital decreases, then the change in leverage reduces
the rate of return on equity much more severely. The higher
the prevailing debt-equity-ratio, the more important is this
negative leverage effect.
Table lo shows actual changes in the rate of return on equity
and the changes computed from equation (7) using the data in table
10. The two columns cannot be identical of course because they
are computed from data of the individual companies. The direction
of change is, however, computed wrongly twice only if we take
the changes in the unweighted and the weighted averages jointly
as a basis for comparison (1972 and 1979). The years of 1966
and 1973 are particularly interesting. While total return on
capital invested rises slightly, the rate of return on equity
declines sharply because the change in the interest rate far
exceeds the change in the rate of return of total capital in-
vested.
- 3o -
Leverage and the Rate of Return
Year Change in the Change in the Difference between Change in the Difference Debt Equity Computed Change in
Rate of Return Rate of Return Rate of Return and Debt-Equity- between Ratio Change in the Rate
on Equity on Total Capi- Effective Interest Ratio Change of the Rate of Return
tal Rate (Leverage Rate of Re of Return on Equity
Factor) turn and on Equity (Weighted
Change of (Unweigh- Data)
Effective ted Data)
Interest
Rate
1961 ----- ----- 3.35 ~~~~ ----- 1.52
1962 -o.24 -0.09 3.1o o.o3 
-o.25 1.55 
-o.2o -o.11
1963 -o.26 +o.o6 3.15 0.00 +o.o5 1.55 +o.14 +0.79
1964 -o.33 -0.10 3.15 o.o4 0.00 1.59 +o.o3 +o.42
+o.64 +o.37 3.28 o.o4 o.12 1.63 +o.7o 
-o.72
1966 -o.74 +o.o3 2.8o 
-o.o3 
-o.48 1.6o 
-o.77 
-o.12
1967 -0.95 
-o.51 2.48 
-o.o4 
-o.32 1.56 -1.16 -0.09
1968 +o.54 +o.o2 2.85 o.o2 +o.37 1.58 +o.66 +0.85
1969 +o.o2 
-o.o6 2.66 o.12 -o.19 1.70 
-o.o6 +o.41
197o -1.47 
-o.o5 1.79 o.16 
-o.87 1.8c -1.38 
-o.67
1971 +0.0S 
-o.3o 1.65 0.06 
-o.14 1.92 -0.47 -3.98
11'72 40.73 
-o.34 1.77 o.o4 +o.12 1.96 
-o.o3 +1.42
1973 -1.90 +o.2o 1.05 o.o7 
-o.72 2.o3 '-1.22 +o.54
1974 -1.27 
-o.23 0.30 o.o4 
-o.75 2.o7 -1.77 
-4.25
1975 +1.65 
-o,59 o.39 -0.01 +0.09 2.o6 
-o.41 +1.18
1976 +3.26 +0.89 2.o5 o.o4 +1.66 2.1o +4.46 +5.75
1977 -5.92 
-1.34 o.74 -0.02 -1.31 2.o8 
-4.o8 -3.95
1978 +o.47 
-o.29 o.68 0.00 
-o.o6 2.o8 
-o.41 
-o.69
1979 +0.80 +o.25 o.86 o.10 +0.18 2.18 +o.73 +1.91
1980
01
Table 1o:
- 31 -
3. The Determinants of the Rate of Return
Three factors seem to dominate the explanation of the develop-
ment of the rate of return of German manufacturing companies:
- the increased intensity of competition
due to the revaluation of the deutschmark
and the price increase for imported raw materials
like oil and mineral ores,
- the tougher bargaining processes resulting in an
effectively higher wage share of firm income,
- the successful attempts on the side of creditors
to shelter credit from erosion by inflation through
higher nominal interest rates (as well as through shorter
amortization periods).
In this section we will take these three determinants up and
look a little closer at their impact on the profitability of
the firms.
3.1. Rates of Return and Business Risk
On an imperfect market intensified competition will result in
a wider-spread of rates of return because while some firms
gain a competitive edge on their competitiors, other hold back
temporarily and have to intensify their efforts to catch up
with the market leaders. The coefficient of variation of the
rates of return among the 222 firms in the sample may therefore
be used as an indicator of the risk of the market place. We
will call this risk the business risk. It has to be borne in
mind, however, that the actual data derived from the financial
reports represent the net effect of the market risk on the one
hand and of the effects of measures taken by the companies to
reduce this risk by e.g. diversification and shifting the asset
structure of the portfolio to less risky assets on the other.
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From Figure 3 we infer that while the average rate of return
among the manufacturing companies in Germany declined over
time, business risk has increased somewhat if we look at the
rates of return before taxes. Taxation has had a double effect.
On the one hand it has cushioned the decline in the rate of
return. On average, the government shouldered the burden of
the loss and profitability with the firms. On the other hand,
however, taxation increased business risk. The coefficient of
variation increased significantly between 1961 and 1979. There
are cyclical influences that account for the deviations from
the general trend. But the structural changes that have brought
about lower profitability and higher risk are nontheless evi-
dent.
Figure 4 presents the data on the real rate of return and on
the coefficient of variation. Again the cyclical pattern is
evident and in fact much more pronounced than in the case of
the nominal data. On the other hand figure 4 conveys the
impression of a structural break between the early sixties
until 1966 and the latter part of the period under investig-
ation. The central of gravity of the return-risk-profile has
certainly shifted downward to the right.
The data we have presented so far indicate that the drop in
the rate of return of German manufacturing companies reflects
a significant structural change in economic climate. Adaptation
to the new environment is a slow process, and obviously some
companies, particularly. the larger ones, though more seriously
affected in the first place,have been able to adapt faster
than others. We will now try to point out some indicators of
changes in corporate policy that have taken place in order to meet
the greater risks of the market place in the seventies.
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Figure 3: Nominal Rate of Return on Total Capital
and Business Risk
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Figure 4: Real Rate of Return on Total Capital
and Business Risk
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Figure 5: Ratios of Portfolio Decisions
German Manufacturing Corporations
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First, investment in plant and equipment was reduced significantly
after 197o. This led to a marked decline of the ratio of fixed
assets to total assets. This shift in the composition of the
business portfolio may not only be interpreted as a reaction
towards less favorable business conditicns profitwise but also
as an attempt to reduce business risk.
Secondly, there is a marked increase in the proportion of
financial and liquid assets in the investment portfolio of
the largest manufacturing corporations since 197o. The smaller
companies, on the other hand, could not shift their assets to
holding liquid assets because, obviously they were under heavier
financial constraints. Part of the success of adaptation of the
larger companies to the changed economic environment may be
attributed to their effective policy of investment in financial
assets rather than in plant and equipment located in Germany.
I would interpret these figures to mean that German corpor-
ations have not responded to increased risk in the environ-
ment by an increased risk preference but rather by intensi-
fied attempts at diversification abroad and at holding a larger
share of risk-free assets.
Figure 5 gives an indication of-the portfolio decisions of
German manufacturing corporations which were taken in order to
cope with the increased business risk of the seventies.
3.2. Rate of Return and Financial Risk
Attempts to limit business risk may not have been completely
voluntary acts of management. They may have been imposed on
the companies by their investors.
We first look at the stock-holders. No empirical study of risk
preference among German stock-holders has been carried out
so far. We use a very crude approach here. We make the heroic
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Fiqure 6: Risk Profiles of Stocks and Bonds
1968 - 1979
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assumption that an investor could have forecast the returns
from a market portfolio of stocks correctly for the years
from 1968 to 1977 and that he was faced with the alternative
to invest in government-bonds with a known distribution of
yields. He could therefore have invested in an (-almost) safe
asset (bonds) with an expected return of 8 percent or a
risky asset (stocks) with an expected return of nearly 16 percent.
The standard deviation was 1.3 on the bonds and 14.4 on the
stocks. The statistical test shows that the returns from the
stocks were normally distributed. The risk profiles the in-
vestor was faced with are shown in figure 6. The risk-premium
on risky assets was about 8 percent. This was the price for
a 3o percent chance of doing worse than by investing in bonds
and for a 14 percent chance to lose money. Taking into con-
sideration also that there was a 6 percent chance of making
more than lo percent on bonds and a 5 percent chance of making
more than 36 percent on stocks, one might well agree with obser-
vers of the German stock-exchange that there is a high risk
aversion among share-holders. Declining profits on capital
invested made it increasingly difficult for the firms to
meet the expectations of investors for risk-premia. Therefore
the firms may have been forced <to stabilize returns and to
invest in less risky and at the same time less profitable in-
vestments.
Financial risk is not limited to share-holders. Creditors also
bear financial risk. Let us measure financial risk by the probab-
ility that the cash flow in any period t does not cover interest
on and amortization of the loan, (1-7) . Thus
L(8) Pr {Ct i + Dt t D
with C - cash flow from investment in period t,
a stochastic variable,
i - interest payment
L - nominal value of loan
D - Duration of credit contract
T - (cumulative) probability
-1 n
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The certainty equivalent for (8) is
- L(9) C - X( a = i + -
with a bar denoting expected values and X the normal deviate of
the standard normal distribution. In (9) at measures business
risk. We assume at to be an exogenous variable attached to the
type of equipment purchased.
We now relate financial risk, 1 - 7, to financial structure.
Let a denote the debt ratio. The equilibrium of demand and
supply for funds is given by
(1o) I = E + L = E + aI
with
I - investment outlay
E - equity capital.
Now setting
- N + 1 
- t -1(11) C N+ C t
t N
(12) C1 = y I
and
D + 1 t(13) it r ' I D
with
r - interest rate
N - economic life time of investment,
- 4o -
- 4o -
we have from (9) and (10) after rearranging
(14) = N-t+1 - -[ 1 + r (D - t + 1) ]I N X
or simplifying
(14') A - y -
For given business risk the debt ratio is a linear function of
financial risk. The debt ratio is therefore a measure of
financial risk. For given business risk (14) specifies the
maximum credit limit. Or conversely, for given credit limits
(14) shows the maximum business risk the corporation can incur
on the investment.
Table lo contains figures on the development of the debt-equity-
ratio. Figure 7 presents the equivalent figures for the static
debt-ratio and adds informatiorlon the development of the
dynamic debt-ratios which indicate the number of years it would
take to pay back net-debt (debt-capital minus cash on hand)
from the annual cash flows.
Creditors have successfully tried to get adequate compensation
for the increased financial risk: Not only in higher interest
rates but also in the form of better control over business
6)
investment policy. Control is exerted via seats on the boards
of directors. Despite the Corporation Act of 1965 which limited
the number of directorates that an individual can hold, and
despite the Co-Determination Act of 1976 that reduced the
- 41 -
- 41 -
number of seats available to share-holders (and thus for
banks owning stock or representing stock) in favor of labor
representatives on the boards, the banks could in fact intensify
their control over industry. This is highlighted by table 11.
Control may be measured by Freeman's Measure of Centrality.
The three major German banks suffered a significant loss in
centrality due to the legislation mentioned. However, the
loss in centrality suffered by all individual top-managers
of the three banks was kept minimal. This was brought about
by increasing the average number of directorship per person
and by placing these persons in highly central directorates.
This led to an increase in the concentration of seats by persons,
measured by the Gini-Coefficient, while, of course, the con-
centration of seats for the three banks at the whole decreased.
Table 11: Concentration, Information Control and Financial Risk
Average Number of Seats: 1964 1978 Change (in percent)
- All Bankers 1.7886 2.2347 +24.94
- Bankers of
Deutsche Bank 3.1613 3.6111 +15.32
Commerzbank 2.6875 3.5625 +32.56
Dresdner Bank 3.4444 2.8333 -17.73
Three Banks Total: 3.1231 3.269o + 4.67
Concentration of Seats:
- All Banks .3334 .357o + 7.o8
- Three Banks Total: .723o .7o74 - 2.16
Centrality of Information:
- All Bankers .76oo .737o - 3.o3
- Banks:
Deutsche Bank .148o .o7oo -52.7o
Commerzbank .o79o .0990 +25.32
Dresdner Bank .o7oo .o82o +17.14
Three Banks Total: .3o7o .251o -18.24
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We conclude that the banks have been able to limit the adverse
effect of the changes in the relevant laws and that they have
retained and in some cases even improved their means of inform-
ation at control on the board of German manufacturing firms.
The banks have an influence on practically all the branches
of industry. Table 12 gives figures that substantiate that
statement.
Table 12: Banking Influence on the Board of Directors,
by Branches, Percentage of Total Directors Positions
Branch Distribution of Percentage of Companies
Directorships in Branch having at
held by the three least one Banker on
major Banks the Board
1978 1964 1978 1964
Energy 5 5 4o
Mining 4 7 18
Chemical Industry 11 14 55
Steel Industry 14 23 48
Metal Industry 12 9 58
Electrotechnical 14 10 53
Industry
Construction 17 15 48
Industry
Retailing 23 17 58
loo loo
The figures of table 12 underestimate the influence of the
German banks on business investment decisions of manufacturing
companies because directorships held by other banks are not
included and furthermore directorships held by general managers
of banks or any other manager of a bank below executive ranks
are not included either.
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3.3. Rates of Return and Wage Share
Business risk is the joint effect of uncertainty of sales and
the uncertainty of expenses. There is no doubt but that in-
creases in the cost of raw materials have been a major source
of risk particularly since 1974. However, wage increases have
posed more serious problems particularly in times when wage
demands lossed touch with developments on the international
markets of German manufacturing firms.
We will first look at the result of the bargaining process
on the manufacturing firms' distribution of nominal value
added. For the computational details of value added see the
appendix. Table 13 indicated that the share of value added
that workers receive rose from 7o percent in 1961 to 81 percent
in 1979. The share that the owners of the companies receive
was reduced to a little over a half of the 1961 share. In the
early seventies, labor increased its share significantly. At
the same time creditors almost doubled their share over their
1961 share. In the late sixties high investment and an increasing
leverage led to an improvement of the net capital share at the
cost of business taxes. When in the early seventies growth
rates declined and wage demands lost touch with the international
economic environment which had changed so drastically for Ger-
man corporations, the stock-holders seem to have taken refuge
in transferring'residual income (profits) into contractual
income (interest) in order to limit the risk of their total
income stream. The improvement in the share of business taxes
in the late seventies is due to a shift from taxes on -earnings
to taxes on property and assets.
The improvement in the real wage share is not quite as signi-
ficant as the improvement in nominal terms. The wage share
rose from 76 percent to 84 percent. During the same period,
the real net capital share decreased from 11.5 percent to
6 percent. Taxes suffered a minor reduction in their share of
real value added only. This is of course due to the fact that
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Table 13: Distribution of Value Added, Nominal, in percent
Year Gross Wage Creditors' Share-Holders' Net-Capital Business Taxes on Adjusted Wage Share
Share Share Share Share Profits and Assets of National Accounts
1961 7o.34 3.79 8.99 12.78 16.88 62.1
1962 71.71 4.o8 8.74 12.82 15.47 62.8
1963 72.21 4.o7 8.61 12.68 15.11 63.2
1964 72.12 3.94 8.7o 12.64 15.24 62.3
1965 73.12 4.17 9.12 13.29 13.59 62.6
1966 73.53 4.90 8.87 13.77 12.7o 63.3
1967 74.28 5.03 8.68 13.71 12.ol 63.2
1968 73.36 4.65 9.13 13.78 12.86 61.3
1969 73.73 4.81 8.56 13.37 12.9o 61.8
1970 75.17 6.16 7.6o 13.76 11.o7 62.7
1971 77.13 5.95 6.76 12.71 lo.16 63.6
1972 77.86 5.23 6.45 11.68 1o.46 63.8
1973 78.32 6.57 5.79 12.36 9.32 64.6
1974 78.81 7.34 5.36 12.7o 8.49 66.3
1975 8o.52 5.91 4.8o lo.71 8.77 66.1
1976 79 .13 5.12 6.19 11.31 9.56 64.9
1977 81.4o 4.76 4.15 8.91 9.69 64.8
1978 81.o9 4.57 4.64 9.21 9.70 63.8
1979 81.14 4.41 4.84 9.25 9.61 63.1
1980 63.2
1) See f. Board of Economic
p. 79
Experts, Annual Report 198o/81, Stuttgart and Mainz 1980,
4Z.
LD
I
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inflation increases nominal taxes by a rate that is higher than
the increase in the cost of living.
Finally, the improvement of labor's position in the distribution
of income is deironstrated by the "Real Wage Position". This indi-
cator was developed by the Board of Economic Experts. The basic
idea behind this indicator is that productivity gains and
improvements in the terms of trade can be distributed to labor
without changing the real cost per unit of output. A rise in
the index of the real wage position indicates that the increase
in wages exceeds the amount available and vice versa. Table 14
shows the development of the real wage position. It is evident
from table 14 and figure 8 that manufacturing suffered more
severely from excessive wage demands than the economy as a
whole (without government).
Summarizing the analyses so far it seems obvious that two major
factors account for the loss in profitability of German manu-
facturing corporations:
1. In the light of business risk that has increased
significantly from the sixties to the seventies
risk averse investors (share-holders and banks) have
effectively changed the investment behavior of manu-
facturing firms towards less risky assets.
2. The trade unions have not been willing to shoulder
part of the increased business risk. On the contrary,
they have increased their share of value added
significantly in the seventies thus reducing the
margin available to pay risk premia for risk-
bearing capital.
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Figure 8: Distributions of Value added, real
in percent
percent
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1)Table 14: Real Wage Position , 1962 = loo
Year National Accounts
with Capital User without Capital User
Cost in the Margin Cost in the Margin
for Distribution for Distribution
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
197o
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
198o
100.0
loo.2
99.0
99.4
loo.2
98.0
97.3
98.1
1o3.9
1o5.8
1o5.6
1o7.3
11o.5
109.0
1o6.6
1o6.5
106.3
1o5.2
1o5.9
100.0
99.4
98.4
98.6
99 .2
97.9
95.9
99 .2
lol .7
1o3.o
1o2.8
1o3.4
1o5.1
1o2.8
101.2
101.1
loo.5
99 .7
99 .7
1) Board of Economic Experts,
p. 217
Annual Report
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1980/81, 1c.cit.
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II. The Regression Analyses
We now turn to a statistical analysis of the time series pre-
sented in the previous section. First we present results of
single equation regressions. Secondly, we explain the develop-
ment of the rate of return on the basis of an econometric model
of the representative German manufacturing firm using multi-
equation regressions.
1. Single Equation Models
1.1. The Rate of Return of All Manufacturing Firms
The simple question of a trend in the time series for nominal
and real rates of return could be answered in the affirmative.
There is a statistically significant trend in the time series
of the rates of return on capital invested as well as on equity
for the manufacturing sector.
The nominal rates of return show a statistically significant
downward trend also in the electrotechnical industry, the
chemical industry, and the machinery industry. The real rates
of return decrease significantly in the chemical industry,
and a statistically significant decrease can also be proved in
the time series of the real rate of return on equity of the
automobile industry, the electrotechnical industry and the
iron and steel industry. I do not present the regression
coefficients here because I do not feel that fitting the
time series to a linear trend-equation is very illuminating.
Multiple linear regressions may provide a better insight in
the determinants of the rate of return. It was decided to
use a time factor, real growth of national product,and the
inflation rate as explanatory variables. I have first treated
the period from 1961 to 1979 as one period and fitted the
regression equations to the data of the total period. Then I
have assumed that there is a structural break in the period,
- 0 -
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so that the years from 1961 to 1968 show an economic behavior
which is different from that of the period from 1969 to 1979.
Table 15 shows the results for the development of the rate
of return on capital invested, while table 16 gives results
for the nominal rate of return on equity. The following con-
clusions may be drawn from the tables:
- The rate of return on total capital increased
between 1961 and 1968 and has decreased ever since.
- The growth rate of gross national product has
a positive impact on the profitability of manu-
facturing companies.
- The inflation rate has a positive influence on the
nominal rate of return on capital. The impact seems
to be stronger than that of the growth rate.
- The rate of return on equity declined over the
total period and certainly over the period from
1969 to 1979. In manufacturing this decline was
certainly more marked than that of the rate of
return on total capital.
- Growth of gross national product has a significant
and rather strong influence on the rate of return
on equity.
- The inflation rate has on the whole an influence
on the nominal rate of return on equity which is
not significant. This is a rather interesting
result. Of course share-holders have experienced that
they do not gain nominally from inflation. Beliefs
that losses in nominal terms do not matter because
stock-holders hold real assets were not well-founded,
however, as will be shown immediately.
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Table 15: Regression Coefficients, Nominal Rate of Return on Total Capital
after Taxes
Firms Constants Trend Growth Rate Inflation Rate R
1961-1979 1961-1968 1969-1979 of GNP
Non-Financial
Corporations
Equation 1 4.3o ---- ---- -. o16 .097 .116 .3393
(.58) (.14) (.14)
Equation 2 ---- 4.223 4.1o4 -.oo7 .1o2 .o22 .3423
(8.ol) (4.38) (.15) (1.91) (.22)
Equation 3 ---- 3.757 ----- .111 .026 .118 .8503
(13.26) (4.76) (1.12) (1.58)
Equation 4 ---- ---- 4.317 -.o87 .159 .146 .7273
(3.68) (1.39) (2.22) (1.31)
Manufacturing
Corporations
Equation 1 5.68 ---- ---- -. 149 .o5o .1o7 .7967
(6.98) (1.07) (1.42)
Equation 2 ---- 5.519 5.4o3 -. 126 .064 .1o3 .8225
(12.64) (7.03) (3.75) (1.41) (1.31)
Equation 3 ---- 4.783 ---- .o15 .oo3 .241 .8oo4
(20.66) ( .78) (.15) (3.94)'
Equation 4 ---- ---- 5.547 -. 164 .109 .152 .8776
(6.96) (5.ol) (2.11) (2.ol)
t - values are given in brackets
(I
Regression Coefficients, Nominal Rate of Return on Equity
after Taxes
Firms Constants Trend Growth Rate Inflation Rate R2
1961-1979 1961-1968 1969-1979 of GNP
Non-Financial
Corporations
Equation 1 7.17 ----- ----- -. o65 .367 -. 113 .6704
(1.o4) (3.58) (.6o)
Equation 2 ---- 6.6o9 5.78 -. oo3) .407 -. o41 .6849
(5.72) (2.82) (.oo3) (3.47) (.19)
Equation 3 ---- 5.867 ----- .134 .176 .378 .7447
(7.55) (2.o9) (2.74) (1.85)
Equation 4 ---- ------ 4.283 -. 018 .6o7 .159 .7928
(1.36) (.11) (3.16) (.53)
Equation 5 6.86 ---------- -. o88 .387 ----- .6612
(1.82) (4.o9)
Manufacturing
Corporations
Equation 1 1o.88 ----- -. 309 .156 .o74 .7o78
(5.oo) (i.15) (.34)
Equation 2 ----- lo.371 9.827 -. 245 .196 .099 .7o15
(7.23) (3.89) (2.22) (1.32) (.39)
Equation 3 ----- 9.789 ------. 163 .095 .345 .9347
(22.18) (4.49) (2.59) (2.96),
Equation 4 -------------- 9.352 -. 249 .274 .154 .4165
(2.o8) (1.35) (.94) (.36)
Equation 5 11.12- ----------- -. 3oo .14o ----- - .7o56
(5.6o) (1.13)
t - values are given in brackets
uL
Table 16:
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Results of the regression equations run for the real rate of
return are given in tables 17 and 18. The results are not
as convincing statistically as one might hope. However, the
following conclusions may be drawn from tables 17 and 18:
- The decline in real rates of return was a
common feature for the whole period.
- The decline in the real rate of return
on equity was more marked than that of
the real rate of return on capital.
- The decline in the real rate of return on
equity was greater than that in the nominal
rate.
- The decline was greater in the period from
1969 to 1979 than in the period from 1961 to 1968,
- The structural break between the sixties and
the seventies is rather significant. It amounts
to .5 percent in the rate of return on total
capital and to over 1 percent in the rate of
return on equity.
- The rate of growth in real GNP has, wherever
significant, a positive effect on the rate
of return.
- The inflation rate has a negative impact on
the real rate of return regardless of which
measure of the real rate of return is taken
and regardless also of which explanatory equation
is used.
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Table 17: Regression Coefficients, Real Rate of Return on Total Capital after Taxes
2
Firms Constants Trend Growth Rate Inflation Rate R
1961-1979 1961-1968 1969-1979 of GNP
Non-Financial
Corporations
Equation 1 3.49 ----- -.o45 .o72 -. 115 .6346
(1.64) (1.6o) (1.37)
Equation 2 ---- 3.226 2.83o -. 015 .o92 -. o81 .6535
(6.32) (3.12) (.33) (1.77) ( .85)
Equation 3 ---- 2.95o ----- .091 .oll -. o3o .6631
(6.66) (2.51) (..31) ( .26)
Equation 4 ---- ----- 2.851 -.o87 .159 .057 .8223(2.84) (1.65) (2.59) ( .59)
Equation 5 3.18 ----- 
-. o69 .927 ----- .5815
(3.o4) (2.o9)
Equation 6 3.95 --. o47 ----- .159 .5628
(1.6o) (1.90)
Manufacturing
Corporations
Equation 1 7.22 ----- ----- -. o5o -. 009 -. 5o8 .845o
(2.15) ( .18) (6.14)
Equation 2 -- 6.o51 5.523 -. 135 -. 019 -. 573 .8396
(6.22) (3.23) (1.81) ( .18) (3.29)
Equation 3 ---- 5.284 ----- .100 
-.o7o -. 6o3 .7859
(6.ol) (1.38) ( .96) (2.6o)
Equation 4 ---- 6.o57 -. 216 .o29 
-. 482 .6964
(2.59) (2.25) ( .19) (2.16)
Equation 5 5.52 
-. 115 .101 ----- .4556
(3.o6) (1.16)
Equation 6 7.16 ----- ----- 
-.o5o 
-. 5o3 .8446
t-values are given in brackets (2.22) (6-69)
Table 18: Regression Coefficients, Real Rate of Return on Equity after Taxes
Firms Constants Trend Growth Rate Inflation Rate R
1961-1979 1961-1968 1969-1979 of GNP
Non-Financial
Corporations
Equation 1 5.43 
-. 176 .226 -. 339 .8516(3.44) (2.7o) (2.19)
Equation 2 ----- 4.663 3.37o -. o83 .286 -. 231 .8735(5.15) (2.12) (1.01) (3.15) (1.39)
Equation 3 ----- 4.128 ----- .o54 .100 .013 .3134(4.29) ( .68) (1.26) ( .05)
Equation 4 ----- ----- 2.383 -. 131 .450 
-.023 .9o57(1.25) (1.3o) (3.87) ( .13)
Equation 5 4.52 ----- ----- 
-. 245 .286 ----- .7969
Eo 6(5.36) (3.19)
Equation 6 6.82 ---- -. 181 ----- -. 474 .7685
Manufacturing (2.93) (?-69)
Coporations
Equation 1 11.48 
----- -. 326 
-. oo8 -. 296 .8492
(6.83) ( .o8) (1.75)
Equation 2 8.112 6.962 -. 289 .119 -. 285 .8281(5.41) (2.64) (2.51) ( .77) (1.o6)Equation 3 ------ 7.483 -. 18 .135 -.538 .4oo4
(4.57) ( .14) ( .99) (1.25)
Equation 4 ------ 8.181 
-. 4o3 .118 
-. 2o3 .6036(2.o7) (2.48) ( .46) ( .54)
Equation 5 lo.49 
-. 364 .o56 ----- .8185
(8.o6) ( .54)
Equation 6 11.43 .326 ----- -. 292 .8492
t-vluearg(7.o6) n(1 .9o)inbra
t-values are given in brackets
I
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1.2. The Rate of Return in the Chemical Industry
As stated earlier, the development of the rate of return in
the different branches of industry does not parallel that of
all manufacturing companies in Germany taken together. We pre-
sent the results for the chemical industry in this section and
refer the reader to the appendix for the results of the re-
gressions on the data of other branches of industry.
Table 19 and 2o give results for the nominal rates of return
on total capital and equity after taxes respectively. I venture
to draw the following conclusions:
- The rates of return on total capital and
on equity declined significantly during the
period 1961 to 1979.
- The structural break in the time series is pro-
nounced. The levels of the rates of return
differ significantly between the sixties and
the seventies. The difference is particularly
pronounced in the case of the rate of return
on equity.
- In the sixties, the rates of return showed a
positive or at least not negative trend.
The negative trend in the seventies is signi-
ficant.
- The growth rate of real GNP had a significant
effect on the rate of return. The effect on the
rate of return on equity was more pronounced
than that on the rate of return on total capital.
- Inflation rates did not have a significant effect
on the nominal rates of return.
- 57 -
Table 19: Regression Coefficients, Nominal Rate of Return on Total Capital after Taxes
- Chemical Industry -
Equation Constants Trend j Growth Rate Inflation Rate R
19 61-19 79 119 61-19 68 T1969 -1 979 of GNP
Equation 1
Equation 2
Equation 3
Equation 4
Equation 5
Equation 6
7.24
7.o6
7.51
6.429
(9.00)
5.357
(1o.52)
5.241
(4.17)
5.931
(3.53)
-.177
(5.54)
-.o9o
(1.63)
.113
(2.69)
-. 159
(2.29)
-. 184
(6.62)
-. 178
(5.69)
.o43
( .61)
.1o2
(1.34)
.o65
(1.54)
.124
(1.14)
.o55
( .85)
-. o54
( .47)
.o57
( .45)
.179
(1.33)
.o97
.6o)
-. o78
( .75)
.7637
.7926
.6813
.6169
.76o2
.7578
t-values are given in brackets
Il
Table 2o: Regression Coefficients, Nominal Rate of Return on Equity
- Chemical Industry -
after Taxes
2
Equation Constants Trend Growth Rate Inflation Rate R
1961-1979 1961-1968 1969-1979 of GNP
Equation
Equation
1
2
Equation 3
Equation 4
Equation
Equation
5
6
1 2 .o7
9.o34
(6.55)
6.416
(7.89)
4.458
(1.84)
5.6o4
(1.51)
11.40
13.57
-. 3o6
(3.96)
.013
( .13)
.325
(4.85)
-. o76
( .50)
-. 332
(4.89)
-. 312
(3.91)
.242
(1.42)
.458
(3.22)
.370
(5.48)
.489
(2.o3)
.285
(1.82)
-. 2o1
.73)
.245
( .99)
.857
(3.99)
.243
( .69)
-. 388
(1.27)
.69o6
.8288
.9284
.513o
.6796
.6489
t-values are given in brackets
I
-n
CO
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In order to exploit the data bank fully, we have run single
equation estimations for the real rates of return not only
with the aggregate data of the 21 firms in the chemical industry,
but also with the pooled data, using the ordinary least squares
method with dummy variables for the individual firms. The con-
stant shown in tables 21 and 22 is the mean value of the 21
firm constants. The results achieved with the pooled regression
method are, however, not more convincing than the results with
the ordinary least squares method for the aggregate data.
From table 21 and 22 we can corroberate what has been said earlier
about the chemical industry:
S- The decline in the real rate of profit
is significant.
- During the sixties, the chemical industry
in fact improved its profitability somewhat
total capital and significantly (using the
leverage effect to the fullest extent) on
equity capital.
- During the seventies the chemical industry
suffered significant annual losses in profi-
tability.
- The structural break in the time series
between the sixties and the seventies
is marked, in fact more marked than in
the case of the nominal data.
- Inflation has a very negative impact on
real profitability. In practically
every equation run the impact of inflation
on the rate of return on equity exceeds that
onthe rate of return on total capital. This
is evidence again that creditors could shelter
their amounts against inflation better than the
stock-holders of the companies in the chemical
industry.
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Table 21-: Regression Coefficients, Real Ratq of Return on Total Capital after Taxes
- Chemical"Itidustry 
-
2
Equation Constants Trend Growth Rate Inflation Rate R
1961-1979 1961-1968 1968-1979 of GNP
Equation 1
OLS 8.34 ---- -. 125 .o7o -. 519 .6714
(2.31) ( .59) (2.7o)
OLSDV 7.84 ---- -. 177 .o33 -. 887 .2939
(3.60) ( .31) (5.o8)
Equation 2 ---- 6.2o7 2.94o .011 .243 -. 733 .841o
(3.97) (1.o7) ( .09) (1.5o) (2.61)
Equation 3 ---- 4.455 ---- .413 .282 -. 819 .7823
(2.21) (2.48) (1 .69) (1 .54)
Equation 4 ---- ---- 5.23o -. 156 .2o1 -. 689 .6926
(1.5o) (1.o31) ( .89) (1.5o)
Equation 5
oLs 6.61 ---- ---- -. 191 .183 ----- .5113
(3.37) (1.39)
OLSDV 4.89 ---- ---- -. 290 .225 ----- .2453
(6.43) (2.16)
Equation 6
OLS 8.78 ---- ---- -. 126 ---- -. 558 .6638
(2.39) (3.17)
OLSDV 8.o5 ---- ---- -. 177 -. 9o5 .2937
(3.62) (5.55)
OLS - Ordinary least squares estimation
OLSDV - Ordinary least squares estimation method with dummy variables for the individual
t-values are given in brackets
f irm
0
Table 22: Regression Coefficients, Real Rates of Return on Equity after Taxes
- Chemical Industry -
Equation Constants Trend Growth Rate Inflation Rate R
1961-1979 1961-1968 1969-1979 Qf GNP
Equation 1
OLS 12.68 ---- ---- -. 293 .2o5 -. 713 .6547
(2.79) ( .89) (1.91)
OLSDV 14.19 ---- ---- -. 493 -. o52 -1.36 .1190
(2.64) ( .13) (2.04)
Equation 2 ---- 6.878 -. 921 .164 .632 -. 513 .8561
(3.ol) ( .23) ( .93) (2.68) (1.25)
Equation 3 ---- 4.754 ---- .833 .817 -1.154 .7819
(1.16) (2.48) (2.41) (1.o7)
Equation 4 ---- ---- 3.7o3 -. 151 .485 -. 444 .8689
(1.52) (1.51) (3.o6) (1.91)
Equation 5
OLS 1o.3o ---- ---- -.384 .359 .57o4
(3.81) (1.54)
OLSDV 9.67 ---- -. 667 .242 .1o92
(3.98) ( .63)
Equation 6
OLS 13.95 ---- ---- -. 298 ----- -. 829 .6366
(2.86) (2.39)
OLSDV 13.87 ---- ---- -. 492 -1.326 .1189
(2.64) (2.13)
OLS - Ordinary least squares estimation
OLSDV - Ordinary least squares method with dummy variables
t-values are given in brackets
for the individual firm
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- Growth of real GNP has a very significant effect
on profitability.
The single equation models clearly show that the combination
of
- rising inflation rates
- decreasing growth rates in the economy
may be considered as the two major determinants of the
declining rates of return in German manufacturing.
The oil-shock and the shock of floating exchange rates have
hit German manufacturing companies very hard. They are operating
now under a different economic climate. They are now working under
fundamentally altered chances of making a reasonable profit.
The chemical industry, the major of German gross industry of
the sixties,- was particularly affected by these shocks and
it has not yet recovered from them as far as profits are con-
cerned.
2. A Multi-Equation Model of German Manufacturing Companies
2.1. The Model
The rate of return on capital that a company earns is the final
result of the interaction of management decisions with the en-
vironment of the company. Management decisions relate to many
functional areas of the company's activities and to many pro-
duct divisions and markets on which the company sells its pro-
ducts. Therefore, it seems a gross simplification of the highly
complex reality if one tries to explain the developpent of the
rate of return by the impact of three determinant factors: time,
real growth rate, and inflation rate.
- 63 -
- 63 -
We will therefore try to explain the development of the rates
of return of German manufacturing industry by the use of a
more complex model. The model is a multi-equation econometric
model of the firm based on the assumption of optimizing be-
havior of the managers and charge of the different functional
areas of the company. The equations are estimated from the
financial data of the firms in the Bonn Data Bank.
The equations of the model were fitted to the data for the
period from 1969 to 1976 in order to allow for ex ante-fore-
casts of the behavior of the model which could be confronted
with actual behavior in the years from 1977 to 1979. The model
has 24 equations. 15 equations describe the behavior of the
firm.
The equations are given below
(15) Cash Flow
CF = (pU-wL-mM-r FK_ -0.15(h VF+m VM)-MA-SAL4) (1-s)T -
+ s d SAV_
(16) Sales
MA 0.156 1 0.062 U 1 0.63U =a 0 N(MA IBU
-B1
(17) Finished Goods
VF = 0.217 U 0.579 w 0.9A -0.3ooVO .374
h(r+.15-h1/h) -1
(18) Output
X = U + VF - VF_
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(19) Investment in Fixed Assets
1
I = 0.036 + 0.352 - ((CF+MA)
i=O q-K
3 UB .-UB. 3 k .- k
+ ( ) + 0.582 - ( -1)
i=0 -i-1 -i=O -i-I
+ 0.22o ' K_
-2
(2o) User-Cost of Capital
c = q r+ ) - + 0.12
(21) Relative Input-Prices for the Investment Function
0.587 0.413
k = w m
c
(22) Depreciation Rate
6 = 0.06 + 0.06 A4
(23) Fixed Assets
K = K_ (1-) + I
(24) Desired Labor Input
= 1.28 X ( ) q
w
0.254
m
w
0.308 -0.017t
e
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(25) Desired Raw Material Input
0.254
M*= 0.90 X ( )
m
w
m
(26) Desired Capacity Utilization
A*= 1.03 (X/K) 0.309 W 0.135q
0.438 -0.017t
e
m 0.095 -0.0053tq-
(27) Actual Labor Input
L = (L*) 0.554 (M*)0.097 0L_  .446 (M_ )-0.097
(28) Actual Raw Material Input
M (L) 0.098 (M*) 0.927 (L) -0.098 (m) 0.073
(29) Capacity Utilization
A = A*( L*/ L_ ) 0.360
(30) Inventories
0.483 w0.331VM = 0. 218 M m0+.5.1 m(m(r+.15Unt /mj0331
(31) -Production Cost per Unit of Output
-0.222
A V- 1
wL + mM + d SAV_ 1
L + M + d SAV_ /q
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0.443
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(32) Plant and Equipment
SAV = SAV_ (1-d) + q - I
(33) Total Capital Invested
GK = SAV + h VF + m VM + 0.45 p - U
(34) Equity
EK = 10.697 ( ) ( 9.245 + 0.068 GK - 81.7 p + 37.6 - r
- 0.212 EK_ 1
(35) Debt Capital
FK = GK - EK
(36) Interest Rate
r = 2.237 r FKm(d-)
- 0.012 FK_1 ) '+ EK
2
(37) Industry Sales
UB = EU
(33) Total Business Investment Outlay in Industry
IB = EI
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The Endogenous Variables are:
A Capacity Utilization
A* :Desired Capacity Utilization
c User Cost of Capital
CF Cash Flow after Taxes
6 Depreciation Rate
EK Equity
FK Debt Capital
GK Total Capital
h Production Cost per Unit of Output
I :Investment in Fixed Assets
IB := Total Investment of Industry
K Total Capital Invested
k Relative Input-Prices for the Investment Function
L Labor Input
L Desired Labor Input
M Raw Material Input
M :Desired Raw Material Input
r Interest Rate dependent on Debt-Equity-Ratio
SAV Plant and Equipment
U Sales
UB Total Sales in Industry
VF Stock of Finished Goods
VM Inventories
X := Output
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The Exogenous Variables are:
d := Depreciation Rate for Taxation Purposes
m Raw Materials Price
MA := Marketing Expenditures of the Firm
MAB Marketing Expenses in Industry
N := Total Demand
p : Product Price
q Price Index of Investment Goods
rM := Market Rate bf Interest
rT - Actual Interest Rate payed by the Firm
P := Cost of Equity
s Corporation Income Tax Rate
SAN := Other Expenditures
t := Period
w : Wage Rate
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2.2. The Results
2.2.1. The Development of the Rate of Return 197o to 1979
Table 23 and figures 9 to 11 show actual and model rates of
return for the period from 197o to 1979. The model underesti-
mates total rates of return before tax but seems to have a ex-
planatory power for the development of the rate of return after
tax, and it describes the development of the rate of return
on equity rather well taking into account the wide fluctuations
in the rate of return on equity that German manufacturing
firms experienced in the period from 1970 to 1979.
2.2.2. Sensitivity Analyses of the Rate of Return
If we accept the multi-equation model as a description of
rational behavior of the German manufacturing firms in a
complex economic environment, then clearly we can study the
impact of certain exogenous variable on the rate of return.
The influences that may be considered important are
- the rate of growth of total demand
- the rate of increase in wages and salaries
- the rate of raw materials price increases
- the rate of technological progress
- the corporation income tax rate
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Table 23: Nominal Rate of Return
on Total Capital before Taxes
Year
197o
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Actual
9
7
8
9
7
8
10
9
9
9
.24
.72
.76
.67
.01
.21
.39
.59
.2o
.43
on Total Capital after Taxes
Year
197o
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Actual
6.11
5.o4
5.o6
5.63
3.81
4.43
5.91
4'. 5o
4.27
4.44
on Equity after Taxes
Year
197o
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Actual
lo.81
7.23
7.71
8.48
4.38
5.11
12.37
8.15
6.71
8.63
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Model
8.392
7.772
7.843
7.440
4.549
5.869
7.649
6.711
6.744
6.688
Model
5.9o4
5.6o8
5.539
5.393
3.749
4.49o
5.35o
4.741
4.76o
4.676
Model
9
8
8
8
3
6
9
8
8
9
.33o
.328
.878
.o66
.481
.258
.763
.317
.523
.o4o
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Figure 9: Nominal Rate of Return on Total Capital
before Taxes
Percent
131
11-
9-
5.
3.
1-
/
/
/
Actual
Model
1
1 97o
A
1973 1976 1979
- 72 -
Year
- 72 -
Figure lo: Nominal Rate of Return on Total Capital
after Taxes
Percent
13
A
Model
- --- Actual
1973 1976
11 -
9 .
5-
3-
1979 Year197o
- 74 -
Table 24: Sensitivity Analysis
Growth Rate of Demand
Year Constant Growth Model Estimates of Rates of Return
Rate of Demand Total Capital Total Capital Equity
before Taxes after Taxes
197o 1.9 8.392 5.9o4 9.33o
1971 1.9 7.6oo 5.5o2 8.o35
1972 1.9 7.6o7 5.391 8.44o
1973 1.9 7.252 5.27o 7.673
1974 1.9 4.948 3.984 4.161
1975 1.9 6.781 4.987 7.739
1976 1.9 7.557 5.3o3 9.752
1977 1.9 6.399 4.56o 7.881
1978 1.9 6.371 4.538 7.9o8
1979 1.9 6.228 4.397 8.135
Year Actual Growth Model Estimates of Rates of Return
Rate of Demand Total Capital Total Capital Equity
before Taxes after Taxes
197o 8.392 5.9o4 9.33o
1971 2.86 7.772 5.6o8 8.328
1972 3.19 7.843 5.539 8.878
1973 3.ol 7.44o 5.393 8.o66
1974 - o.3o 4.549 3.749 3.481
1975 - 2.57 5.969 4.49o 6.258
1976 2.64 7.649 5.35o 9.763
1977 2.8o 6.711 4.741 8.317
1978 3.5o 6.744 4.76o 8.523
1979 4.5o 6.688 4.676 9.o4o
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Figure 12: Sensitivity Analysis: Growth of Demand
Rate of Return on Total Capital
before Taxes
Percent
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Figure 13: Sensitivity Analysis: Growth of Demand
Rate of Return on Total Capital
after Taxes
Percent
Actual Rate
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Figure 14: Sensitivity Analysis: Growth of Demand
Rate of Return on Equity after Taxes
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The impact of the rate of growth of demand on profitability
does not seem to be very significant. In fact, the average
growth rate during the period is lo percent below the actual
growth rate, but the average rate of return on capital after
taxes is only 1 percent below the rate of return on the basis
of the actual growth of demand. Table 24 and figures 12 to 14
show the results of the sensitivity analyses. It is plausible
that rates of return on the basis of a constant rate of growth
of demand should be higher in periods when actual growth rates
were lower and vice versa.
We now look at the influence that wage increases have on the
rate of return in our representative manufacturing firm. Table
25 and figures 15 to 17 demonstrate the devastating effects
that the exorbitant wage demands of the early seventies had
on the rates of return of German manufacturing companies. In
fact, the constant growth rate is higher by roughly 3 percent
than the average rate of increase of wages and salaries during
the period. The influence on the total rate of return is less
important than that on the rate of return on equity. Of course
the oil-price-hike of 1973/74 could have been absorbed even
if the wage increases had beenconstant over the period. But
the combination of excessive wage demands and increases in
the price of oil had a remarkable effect on the rate of return
on equity after taxes: it dropped from over 9 percent to 3.5
percent within 4 years. Since during 1978 and 1979 wage increases
were well below the assumed constant rate of growth, the sensitiv-
ity analysis shows that the rate of return on the basis of the
actual data is above the rate of return in the constant rate of
increase case.
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8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
8.33
~- 1
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Table 25:
197o
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Sensitivity Analysis, Increase in Wages and Salaries
Constant Annual Model Estimates of Rates of Return
Increase in Wages Total Capital Total Capital Equity
before Taxes after Taxes after Taxes
8.392
9.154
9.351
9.925
7.7o9
8.556
8.997
7.445
6.ol11
4.976
5
6
6
6
5
6
6
5
4
3
.9o4
.434
.438
.873
.628
.o27
.149
.175
.317
.649
.33o
.42o
.116
.81o
.775
.383
.8o9
.429
.222
.965
Year Actual Increases Model Estimates of Rates of Return
in Wages Total Capital Total Capital Equity
before Taxes after Taxes after Taxes
197o 8.392 5.9o4 9.33o
1971 11.3o 7.772 5.6o8 8.328
1972 8.92 7.843 5.539 8.878
1973 1o.42 7.44o 5.393 8.o66
1974 10.19 4.549 3.749 3.481
1975 7.89 5.969 4.49o 6.258
1976 6.36 7.649 5.35o 9.763
1977 ,7.11 6.711 4.741 8.317
1978 5.31 6.744 4.76o 8.523
1979 5.78 6.688 4.676 9.o4o
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The influence of the price for raw materials is very important
indeed. In the model simulation we have assumed that the average
growth rate of the price index was about the same in the two
simulations. However, the price was kept at a constant 6.1
percent over the period in one simulation run, while the actual price
increases were used as exogenous variables in the other simulations
Table 26 and figures 18 to 2o show the results. In interpreting
these results we have to keep in mind that the model does not
assume that cost-plus-pricing is possible. It is on the other
hand certainly not very realistic to assume that pricing
behavior is unaffected by the short-term development of raw
materials prices. The model assumes prices as given, however,
and allows for adjustments only in the labor input, in invest-
ment activityand in the desired raw materials input. The most
interesting result is that the fluctuations in the rate of re-
turn on equity would have been even greater than in the case
of the actual price increases if raw material prices had increased
at a constant rate over the period. Obviously these fluctuations
are due to the actual pricing policy which we have assumed con-
stant. Since prices do follow the development of the cost of raw
materials to some extent, the simulation with a constant
rate of increase in the raw materials price overestimates the
fluctuations in the rate of return on equity.
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Table 26: Sensitivity Analysis: Price Increase for Raw Materials
Year Constant Rate Model Estimates of Rates of Return
of Price Increase Total Capital Total Capital Equity
for Raw Materials before Taxes after Taxes after Taxes
197o 6.1 8.392 5.9o4 9.33o
1971 6.1 6.232 4.687 5.977
1972 6.1 4.572 3.586 3.869
1973 6.1 4.42o 3.594 3.331
1974 6.1 9.4o2 6.644 11.636
1975 6.1 9.656 6.691 12.261
1976 6.1 1o.629 7.128 14.515
1977 6.1 7.821 5.4o1 1o.o63
1978 6.1 6.o53 4.343 7.3o1
1979 6.1 5.83o 4.161 7.477
Year Actual Price for Model Estimates of Rates of Return
Raw Materials Total Capital Total Capital Equity
before Taxe.s after Taxes after Taxes
197o 8.392 5.9o4 9.33o
1971 2.oo 7.772 5.6o8 8.328
1972 1.96 7.843 5.539 8.878
1973 7.79 7.44o 5.393 8.o66
1974 3o.24 4.549 3.749 3.481
1975 1.37 5.969 4.49o 6.258
1976 4.o5 7.649 5.35o 9.763
1977 1.65 6.711 4.741 8.317
1978 1.90 6.744 4.76o 8.523
1979 6.23 6.688 4.675 9.o4o
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Figure 18: Sensitivity Analysis: Price Increase for
Raw Materials
Rate of Return on Total Capital before Taxes
Percent
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Over the past twenty years manufacturing industry has realized
a rate of technological progress of 1.7 percent. In order to
analyze the importance of the rate of technological progress
in the production function we assume that the rate of techno-
logical progress was 1.45 percent and 1.95 percent respectively.
Table 27 and figures 21 to 23 show the results of the simul-
ation runs. They are as expected. Other factors remaining equal
technological progress results in higher profitability of
capital and particularly of equity. Technological progress
of 1.95 percent could have brought back the rate of return
of total capital to the 197o rate by 1979 if prices and wages
had remained unaffected. The'rate of return on equity could
have been increased to 12 percent. However, the actual rate
of technological progress of 1.7 percent was not adequate to
stem the decrease in the total rate of return and was just suffi-
cient to bring the rate of return on equity back to 197o
levels. We have shown in an earlier paper that over the past
twenty years productivity gains have in the medium-term re-
sulted in higher wages. In fact, capital gained only shortly
and only to the extent that a firm gained a technological ad-
vantage over its competitors. Once the majority of the firms
had improved production the wage earners effectively intern-
alized the technological progress in their wage increases7.
The model used in the simulation runs uses the wage rate as
an exogenous variable so that technological progress benifits
the stock-holders only.
We conclude that technological progress is a very significant
factor as far as the rate of return on equity is concerned,
particularly in the short-run. Technological progress was,
however, not adequate to offset the negative influences of
increased international competition as well as of immoderate
wage demands on the return on capital in German manufacturing
companies.
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Figure 21: Sensitivity Analysis: Technological Progress
Rate of Return on Total Capital before Taxes
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Figure 22: Sensitivity Analysis: Technological Progress
Rate of Return on Total Capital after Taxes
Percent
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Figure 23: Sensitivity Analysis: Technological Progress
Rate of Return on Equity after Taxes
Percent
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Table 27: Sensitivity Analysis, Rate of Technological Progress
Year Technological Model Estimates of the Rate of Return
Progress Total Capital Total Capital Equity
before Taxes after Taxes
197o 1.45 8.392 5.9o4 9.33o
1971 1.45 7.579 5.4o2 8.o33
1972 1.45 7.425 5.289 8.243
1973 1.45 6.777 4.997 7.o37
1974 1.45 3.653 3.214 1.919
1975 1.45 4.848 3.822 4.378
1976 1.45 6.295 4.542 7.519
1977 1.45 5.o48 3.748 5.551
1978 1.45 4.8o3 3.599 5.229
1979 1.45 4.5o3 3.37o 5.166
Year Technological Model Estimates of the Rate of Return
Progress Total Capital Total Capital Equity
before Taxes after Taxes
197o 1.7 8.392 5.9o4 9.33o
1971 1.7 7.772 5.6o8 8.328
1972 1.7 7.843 5.539 8.878
1973 1.7 7.44o 5.393 8.o66
1974 1.7 4.549 3.749 3.481
1975 1.7 5.969 4.49o 6.258
1976 1.7 7.649 5.35o 9.763
1977 1.7 6.711 4.741 8.317
1978 1.7 6.744 4.76o 8.523
1979 1.7 6.688 4.676 9.o4o
Year Technological Model Estimates of the Rate of Return
Progress Total Capital Total Capital Equity
before Taxes after Taxes
197o 1.95 8.392 5.9o4 9.33o
1971 1.95 7.959 5.72o 8.614
1972 1.95 8.243 5.781 9.492
1973 1.95 8.o78 5.774 9.o52
1974 1.95 5.4o8 4.261 4.958
1975 1.95 7.o31 5.124 8.o15
1976 1.95 8.921 6.11o 11.837
1977 1.95 8.256 5.664 lo.841
1978 1.95 8.527 5.826 11.439
1979 1.95 8.665 5.859 12.465
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Finally we analyze the net effect of the rate of corporation
income tax on the rate of return. The effect on the rate of
return before taxes is not negligible. This is due to the fact
that taxes affect investment behavior and production and thus
indirectly also the rate of return before taxes.- A 4o percent
corporation income tax is the tax rate used in estimating
the model. During the years when profitability was low a change
in the tax-rate did not affect the rate of return on equity
and after taxes very much. However, in the late seventies the
rate of return on equity would have increased by 1 percentage
point if the rate of corporation income tax had been lower by
5 percentage points. The results are given in table 28 and
figures 24 to 26.
2.2.3. Forescasts of the Rate of Return for 1981 and 1982
If we make forecasts for the exogenous variables, we can fore-
cast the rates of return with the help of our model. We will
have to keep in mind that the model was estimated from actual
data for the period from 197o to 1976. The actual exogenous
variables for 1977 to 1979 wert used to compute the endogenous
variables, particularly the rates of return, for these years.
The actual exogenous variables for 198o are preliminary values.
The exogenous variables for 1981 and 1982 are my forecasts.
These forecasts are given in the form of two scenarios, a more
pessimistic one and a more optimistic one. Table 29 shows the
forecasts used in the model prognosis of the rates of return .
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Table 28: Sensitivity Analysis: Corporation Income Tax
Year Corporate Income Model Estimates of the Rate of Return
Tax on Total Capital on Total Capital Equity
before Taxes after Taxes after Taxe
197o 35 7.914 5.9o4 9.33o
1971 35 7.585 5.758 8.726
1972 35 7.6o7 5.676 9.255
1973 35 7.246 5.525 8.436
1974 35 4.479 3.8o6 3.645
1975 35 6.o33 4.718 6.912
1976 35 7.768 5.714 lo.792
1977 35 6.962 5.149 9.441
1978 35 7.o5o 5.2o5 9.754
1979 35 6.962 5.1o4 10.27o
Year Corporate Income Model Estimates of the Rate of Return
Tax on Total Capital on Total Capital Equity
before Taxes after Taxes after Taxc
197o 4o 8.392 5.9o4 9.330
1971 4o 7.772 5.6o8 8.328
1972 4o 7.843 5.539 8.878
1973 4o 7.44o 5.393 8.o66
1974 4o 4.549 3.749 3.481
1975 4o 5.969 4.49o 6.258
1976 4o 7.649 5.35o 9.763
1977 4o 6.711 4.741 8.317
1978 40 6.744- 4.76o 8.523
1979 4o 6.688 4.676 9.o4o
Year Corporate Income Model Estimates of the Rate of Return
Tax on Total Capital on Total Capital Equity
before Taxes after Taxes after Taxes
197o 45 8.958 5.9o4 9.33o
1971 45 7.999 5.46o 7.938
1972 45 8.129 5.4o5 8.5o9
1973 45 7.668 5.259 7.693
1974 45 4.623 3.686 3.3o1
1975 45 5.883 4.256 5.589
1976 45 7.484 4.972 8.694
1977 45 6.389 4.32o 7.149
1978 45 6.368 4.3o8 7.26o
1979 45 6.365 4.25o 7.8o2
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Figure 24: Sensitivity Analysis: Corporation Income Tax
Rate of Return on Total Capital before Taxes
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Figure 25: Sensitivity Analysis: Corporation Income Tax
Rate of Return on Total Capital after Taxes
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Figure 26: Sensitivity Analysis: Corporation Income Tax
Rate of Return on Equity after Taxes
Percent
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Table 29: Forecasts of Exogenous Variables
Growth Rate in Percent
Variable 198o 1981 1982
Scenario 1,2 1 2 1 2
Price for
Raw Materials
Wages and
Salaries
Demand (real)
Price of
Product
Price of Invest-
ment Goods
Interest Rate*
on Long-Term Debt
Cost of Equity*
Other Expenditure
and Marketing
Expenditures
Actual Interest*
Payment on Debt
5.64
7.1 o
2.oo
4.28
5.49
8.9o
13.1o
6.87
3.4o
6.49
5.3o
-1 .00
4.o8
4.73
9.60
12.8o
5.2o
4.90
-0.40
4.5o
5.oo
9.6o
13.1o
5.22
3,.7o
6.9o
5.4o
1.o5
3.3o
4.8o
8.50
12.8o
5.7o
4.5o
3 .Oo
4.oo
5.oo
8 .00
13.1o
5.56
3.30
* Absolute values
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Scenario 1 is pessimistic with respect to the real growth
of the German economy. Some of the Economic Research Institutes
have forecast an even greater decrease in real growth, however.
Scenario 2 is more optimistic for 1981. The -'.4 percent growth
rate is the rate forecast for GNP-growth by the Board of Econ-
omic Experts. Significant differences exist between the two
scenarios for 1982. Scenario 1 assumes that there will be
imported inflation, resulting in high wage demands, whereas growth
is too slow to allow for better capacity utilization and higher
prices for the domestic goods. The interest rate remains fairly
high. Scenario 2, on the other hand, forecasts a sharp turn in econ-
omic activity. This is brought about by more moderate wage demands,
which are followed by an increased confidence in the German
economy. This results in a revaluation of the deutschmark and
thus reduces the pressure on profitablity from raw materials
prices and oil prices fixed in dollars. Demand rises by three
percent in real terms which brings about better capacity util-
ization. This means a better bargaining position with customers
and higher prices. This, of course, results in significant im-
provements in the rate of return.
Figures 27 to 29 show the results of the model forecasts. In
the pessimistic scenario total profit continues to fall. The
rate of return on equity decreases sharply between 1981 and
picks up only slightly in 1982. In the optimistic scenario 2
profits rise to 197o levels, while the rate of return on equity
shows a pronounced rise to a level above that of the seventies.
These forecasts underscore the sensitivity of the rate of
return of German manufacturing corporations to competition on
the one hand and to wage increases on the other. Competition
reduces the chances of increasing prices to customers,- and
wage increases lead to less profitable production, reduce
the profit per unit of output and reduce the level of production.
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Figure 27: Rate of Return on Total Capital before Taxes
, Percent
Scenario 2
Scenario 1
Year
1976 1979 1982
- 101 -
13
11
7-
3-
197o 1973
T - Ron
- 101 -
Figure 28: Rate of Return on Total Capital after Taxes
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Figure 29: Rate of Return on Equity after Taxes
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I would like to conclude by'saying that the declining rates
of return on capital and on equity certainly were a phenomenon
of the seventies. They are, however, by no means a tendency
that should be considered as a given for the future. On the
contrary, they seem to me to be a combined effect of structural
changes in the world economy brought about by the break-down
of the system of fixed exchange rates and by OPEC on the one
hand and by excessive wage demands and lenient governments
on the other. The eighties might witness a change to improved
profitability. Whether the favorable conditions required for
such a reversion of the trend can be brought about in Germany
remains doubtful, however.
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Ansatz zur empirischen Analyse des Unternehmenssektors -
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198o (unpublished).
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5) See Appendix
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Krupp, 0. Kyn (Hrsg.), Income Distribution and Economic
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6) Kless, H.-P., Interlocking Directorates, M.A. Thesis,
Bonn 198o (unpublished)
8) See Appendix 6 for the time series of exogenous variables.
Appendix 1:
Definitions of Capital, Profits and
Nominal Profitability Rates
1.1. Balance Sheet of German Corporations
Code
Assets Number
I. Fixed Assets
A. Tangible and Intangible
1. Real Estate and equivalent rights with office,
factory and other buildings 120
2. Real Estate and equivalent rights with residential
buildings 121
3. Real Estate and equivalent rights without
buildings 122
4. Buildings on real estate not owned, not inclu-
ded in No. 1 or 2 123
5. Machinery, plant and equipment 125
6. Office equipment 126
7. Plant under construction and advantages for plant 127
8. Concessions, industrial proper rights, and similar
rights 128
B. Investments
1. Affiliated companies 135
2. Securities, bonds, shares.,not included in No.1 136
3. Loans for a term of at least four years 137
- secured by mortgages 138
4. Other monetary assets 139
II. Current Assets
A. Inventories
1. Raw materials and supplies 145
2. Work in process 146
3. Finished products
B. Products on lease 150
C. Other Current assets
1. Advances paid 151
2. Accounts receivable for sales and services 152
3. Notes receivable 153
4. Checks 154
5. Cash on hand, balances at the Federal Bank and in
postal checking accounts 155
6. Cash in banks 156
7. Securities 157
8. Accounts receivable from affiliates 160
9. Receivables resulting from loans granted under
paragraph 89, Corporate Law 161
10. Other current assets 162
III. Deferred Charges and Repaid Expenses 170
IV. Loss 180
VI. Total 190
Capital and Liabilities
I. Capital Stock
1. Common shares 210
2. Preferred shares 211
II. Surplus Reserves
1. Statutory reserve 215
2. Free reserve 216
III. Special Items with Reserve Shares 220
IV. Qualifying Reserves
1. Reserve for depreciation 230
147
2. Inventory reserve 231
3, Other value adjustments 232
V. Accruals
1. Pension 240
2. Other 241
VI. Liabilities for a Term of at last Four Years
1. Bonds 250
- secured by mortgages 251
2. Liabilities to banks 252
- secured by mortgages 253
3. Others 254
- secured by mortgages 255
Of the amounts included in items 1-3 is due
within less than four years 259
4. Loans from pension fund 260
VII. Other Liabilities
1. Accounts payable for puchases and services 261
2. Notes payable 262
3. Liabilities to banks 263
4. Advances received 264
5. Payables to affiliates 265
6. Others 266
VIII. Deferred Credits 270
IX. Profit available for Dividend 280
1.2. Profit and Loss Statement
Sales Revenue including turnover - tax
- Turnover tax
310
311
= Sales Revenue 315
+ Increase / Decrease in inventories of finished
and semi-finished products 316
+ Other company-manufactured capitalized items 317
= Total Gross Revenue 320
- Cost of raw materials and supplies 322
= Balance 325
+ Income from profit transfer for agreement 330
+ Income from affiliates 331
+ Income from other investments 332
+ Other interest and similar income 333
+ Gains from sale of plant property and equipment
and valuation adjustments 334
+ Reduction of uncollectables revenue 335
+ Reserval of accruals 336
+ Transfers from special reserves 337
+ Other income 338
- Wages and salaries
- Compulsory welfare
- Pensions and assistance
- Depreciation on tangible and intangible assets
- Write downs and other valuation adjustments
of investments
Valuation adjustment on current assets other than
inventories and general reserves for accounts
receivable
- Loss of retirement of fixed assets
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
- Interest and similar expenses 357
- Taxes
(a) on income and property 358
(b) other 360
- Equalization of Burdens Property Levy 361
- Transfer of losses of affiliates 362
- Transfer to special items with Reserve Shares 363
- Other expenses 364
Net income for the year 370
+ Profit / Loss carry forward (last year) 371
+ Drawing from reserves 373-377
- Allotment to reserves 378-380
= Profit available for dividend 390
Dividend on common shares 395
Dividend on preferred shares 396
Profit / Loss carry forward 397
1.3. Definitionsof Capital, Profits and Nominal Profitability
Rates
1.3.1. Basic Terms
- Total Capital:
- Equity Capital:
- Debt Capital.
190-230-231-232
210+211+215+216+397
+0.5-220
Total Capital
- Equity Capital
- Market Value of Capital
(= book value of debt +
market value of equity)
Book Value of Debt = Total Capital - Equity Capital
Market Value of Equity = Basic Capitalx Stock Price
Net Income:
- Interest:
- Interest on Total Capital:
- Taxes:
- Dividends:
- Interest on Total Capital before
Taxes:
370
357
370+357
358
395+396
370+357+358
Appendix 2:
The Computation of Real Rates of Return
1.1. Definiti.on of inflationary gain
Let
At operating expenses...
WBW : ... at replacement cost.
... at historical cost
: inflationary gain
t:...in period t
t-tt:...in period t-tt
SG t WBWSt :=Ae
HIST
- At
The computation is to be made for all tangible assets in-
volved the production process.
1.2. Fixed assets
Let
SGSAV
ABSAV
RBW
ABFAK
ZSAV
ZSAV
inflationary gain associated with fixed
assets
depreciation
fixed assets net of accumulated
depreciation
depreciation rate depending on the for-
mula of depreciation
additions to fixed assets
tt-1
t-tt
- E ABSAV ttt+
i=0
RBWFAK ttt
ZSAVt-tt
HIST
SG
then
= price index at period t
price index at period t-tt
then
= WBW
t -
HIST
t
= ABSAVWBW - ABSAVHIST
t, t
WBW HIST
= AFAKt (RBW - RBWHTt t t
ND
= AFAK t ZSAVt-i RBWFAKtrt-i PSFAKtjt-i
with ND : economic life time of assets
Remark:
It is assumed that the depreciation at current cost will
be reinvested immediately to bear an interest. Otherwise
depreciation at current cost will not cover total re-
placement cost of the asset at a later replacement data.
1.3. Inventories
The inflationary gain depends on the stock valuation
method used. Here a formula is derived which applies to
the periodic weighted average method because the latter
is standard in German practice. To simplify presentation
it is assumed that real quantities of stocks and flows
are constant.
SGSAV :t
PS;Kt,t-tt
Let
SGVOR inflationary gain from inventories
VORt- beginning inventory for period t
VORt ending inventory for period t
COGS : cost of goods sold
PSVOR rate of price change given for the periodic
average method by
VOR + COGS
PSVORt:
t- 1
VORt-1 + COGSt-1
WBW HISTthen SGVORt : A - Att t
= VORt 
- VORt-1
= VORt-1 (1+ PSVORt) 
- VORt-1
= VORt-1 PSVORt
1.4. Securities of affiliates
Inflationary gains are also contained in dividends from secur-
ities of affiliates. Its is assumed that the securities re-
present a part of the assets of these affiliates and that
these assets "produce" inflationary gains for the same rea-
sons and in the same composition as assets in the parent
company do.
Let
SGBET inflationary gain from affiliates
AV : fixed assets
UV : current assets
BET : securities of affiliates
then SGSAV +SGVQR
SGBET = BETt
AVt + UVt
1.5. Total inflationary gain
Let
SG total inflationary gain
then
SGt = SGSAVt + SGVORt + SGBETt
1.6. Net concept
In accordance with the net concept the inflationary gain
has to be distributed between equity and debt capital.
Here the following method in applied
Let
EK : equity capital
FK : debt capital
SGEK inflationary,gain arisen from equity-finan-
ced asset
SGFK inflationary gain arisen from debt-finan-
ced assets
Distribution by structure of assets
Let AV t< EKt < AVt + BETt
EKt- AVt
then SGEKt SGSAVt + T t SGBETt
BETt
with SGFKt = SCt - SGEKt
1.7. Final remark
The so computed inflationary gain represents a self-re-
financing gap which may be filled by charging this amount
in addition to operating expenses computed at historical
cost. An adequate operating cash flow is a necessary
condition.
1.8. Definition of Real Profitability Rates
- Real Rate of Return on Capital before Taxes
Interest on Capital before Taxes - SG
Total Capital + DWSAV
DWSAV: valution difference at fixed assets
= fixed assets at replacement cost minus fixed
assets at historical cost
- Real Rate of Return on Capital after Taxes:
Interest on Total Capital - SG
Total Capital + DWSAV
- Real Rate of Return on Equity before Taxes:
Net Income + Taxes - SGEK
Equity Capital + DWSAV
- Real Rate of Return on Equity after Taxes:
Net Income - SGEK
Equity Capital + DWSAV
Appendix 3 Nominal Rate of Return o-n Equity after Taxes
loo Manufacturing Corporations
Year Unweighted means
1952 .73
1953 3.46
1954 3.75
1955 6.o7
1956 7.3A
1957 7.2o
1958 7.31
1959 1_._4
196o 11.59
Appendix 4_: Distribution of Value Added
The computation of value added is based on distribution.
The gross wages are computed as the sum of wages and salaries,
compulsory welfare and pensions and assistance, the creditors
share are interest and similar payments, the shareholders income
is the corporation's net income for the year, the net-capital
share is the amount distributed among creditors and share-
holders. Business taxes on profits and assets are all corporate
taxes. All ratios are related to the total sum of the value
added. They are computed on data of individual income state-
ments and are therefore unweighted averages of the corporations
of the Bonn Sample.
Appendix 5 :
Determinants of the Rate of Return
- Regression Analysis -
Table 1 : Regression Coefficients, Nominal Rate of Return on Total Capital after Taxes
- Automobile Industry -
Equation
Equation
Equation
Equation
Equation
Equation
Equation
1
2
3
4
5
6
1961-1979
6.11
4.84
7.36
Constants Trend
1961-1968
5.112
(3.26)
4.847
(4.61)
1969-1979
3.571
(1.29)
-. 433
(0.20)
Growth Rate
of GNP
Inflation Rate
__________________ I -I-. _____________________
.028
(0.42)
.131
(1.09)
.046
(0.53)
.282
(2.27)
-. 021
(0.34)
.023
(0.34)
.200
(1.61)
.271
(1.67)
.027
(0.31)
.556
(3.52)
.283
(1.96)
-. 382
(1.61)
-. 227
(0.81)
.416
(1.50)
-. 043
(0.14)
-. 496
(2.17)
.3372
.3837
.3666
.4778
.2231
.2552
t-values are given in brackets
Regression Coefficients, Nominal Rate of Return on Equity after Taxes
- Automobile Industry -
____________I__ -. pr -I
Equation Constants
1961-1979 1961-19681 1969-1979
Trend Growth Rate
of GNP
___________ I I I~ I I~ I I
Equation
Equation
Equation
Equation
Equation
Equation
13.82
9.53
18.60
11.542
(1 .72)
19.360
(2.76)
8.014
(0.68)
.564
(0.08)
F
.121
(0.43)
.357
(0.69)
1.455
(2.52)
.979
(2.56)
-. 044
(0.17)
.103
(0.36)
t-values are given in brackets
Inflatio n Rate
.765
(1.25)
.927
(1.34)
.004
(0.007)
1.148
(2.35)
1 .044
(1.78)
-1,290
(1.30)
-. 932
(0.78)
.681
(0.37)
-1.377
(1.46)
-1.722
(1.82)
.2658
.2814
.6799
.6212
.1334
.1896
_____________ I ___________ A ___________ I___________ I _________ .1 _____________ I ________________
Table 2 :
R2
Table 3 :
Equation
Equation 1
OLS
OLSDV
Equation
Equation
Equation
Equation
OLS
2
3
4
5
o ISDV
Equation 6
OLS
OLSDV
Regression Coefficients, Real Rate of Return on Total Capital after Taxes
- Automobile Industry -
1961-1979
5.71
6.44
1.37
2.90
6.85
7.50
Constants
1961-19
5.281
(2.37)
4.137
(3.65)
6 8 1968 1979
3.580
(0.91)
1.000
(0.30)
OLS - Ordinary least squares estimation, OLSDV -
t-values are given in brackets
Trend
.175
(1.30)
.015
(0.22)
.108
(0.63)
.165
(1.77)
.249
(1 .29)
.008
(0.06)
-. 122
(1.84)
.171'
(1.30)
.011
(0.16)
Growth Rate
of GNP
.182
(0.62)
.169
(1.14)
.209
(0.91)
-. 045
(0.48)
.570
(2.32)
.464
(1 .42)
.400
(2.61)
Inflation Rate
-1.302
(2,73)
-1.070
(4.44)
- .398
(2.35)
- .186
(0.62)
- .658
(1.38)
-1
(3
-1
(5
.405
.21)
.160
.16)
Ordinary least squares nethod with dummy
for the individual firms
.4099
.4936
.5925
.5878
.5513
.1166
.3786
.3950
.4861
vArir ab]s (,S,
Table 4 : Regression Coefficients, Real Rates of Return on Equity after Taxes
Automobile Industry -
Equation
Equation 1
OLSDV
Equation 2
Equation 3
Equation 4
Equation
OLS
5
OISDV
Equation
OLS
6
OLSDV
___________________ - _____________________ 
- r I
1961-1979
10.10
10.42
6.19
6.32
13.40
14.66
Constants
1961-1968
8.207
(2,27)
12.150
(3.58)
OLS - Ordinary least squares
t-values are given in brackets
1968-1979
5.465
(0.86)
-1.018
(0.26)
r
estimation, O 1SDV -
Trend
-. 106
(0.69)
-. 073
(0.44)
.073
(0.26)
-. 684
(2.44)
.415
(1.80)
-. 256
(1.69)
-. 230
(1.51)
-.118
(0.74)
-. 089
(0.52)
Growth Rate
of GNP
.531
(1.58)
.680
(1.84)
.649
(1.74)
.002
(0.005)
1.025
(3.49)
.785
(2.25)
.945
(2.69)
Inflation Rate
1.171
(2.15)
-1.220
(2.05)
-. 873
(1.35)
-. 039
(0.04)
-. 802
(1.41)
-1.472
(2.76)
-1.608
(2.84)
.5391
.4806
.5582
.6368
.6828
.3969
.4556
.4627
.4603
Ordinary least squares method with dummy variables
for the individual firms
, ,I
Table 5 : Regression Coefficients, Nominal Rate of Return on Total Capital after Taxes
-:Electrotechnical Industry -
2
Equation Constants Trend Growth Rate Inflation Rate R
1961-1979 1961-1968 1969-1979 of GNP
Equation 1 6.06 ----- -. 138 .016 .011 .489o
(3.26) (0.17) (0.08)
Equation 2 ----- 6.647 7.547 -. 199 -. 025 --.079 .5193
(6.64) (4.29) (2.58) (0.24) (0.44)
Equation 3 5.414 ----- .150 -. 152 -. 004 .8125
(7.61) (2.56) (2.58) (0.02)
Equation 4 7.895 -. 305 .086 .079 .8852
(6.36) (5.98) (1.07) (0.67)
Equation 5 6.10 ----- ----- -. 137 .014 ----- .4888
(3.74) (0.16)
Equation 6 6.17 ----- -. 139 ----- .002 .4879
(3.38) (0.02)
t-values are given in brackets
Table 6 : Regression Coefficients, Nominal Rate of Return on Equity after Taxes
- Electrotechnical Industry -
Equation
Equation
Equation
Equation
1
2
3
Equation 4
Equation
Equation
5
6
1961-1979
10.90
12.09
12.61
Constants
1961-1968
11.393
(3.45)
13.178
(5.79)
1969-1979
12.148
(2.09)
7.095
(1 .48)
Trend
-. 352
(2.59)
-. 403
(1 .59)
.313
(1.67)
-. 545
(2.76)
-. 307
(2.57)
-. 359
(2.65)
Growth Rate
of GNP
.274
(0.92)
.239
(0.70)
-. 453
(2.40)
.969
(3.11)
.197
(0.71)
Inflation Rate
.355
(0.73)
.279
(0.47)
-. 543
(0.90)
1.224
(2.68)
.199
(0.44)
_________________________ I ______________________ I -I I I 4 _____________________
t-values are given in brackets
.3722
.3747
.7673
.8224
.3497
.3370-- i---
Table 7 : Regression Coefficients, Real Rate of Return on Total Capital after Taxes
- Electrotechnical Industry -
Equation
Equation
OLS
1
OLSDV
Equation
Equation
Equation
Equation
OLS
2
3
4
5
OISDV
Equation
OLS
OLS DV
6
Constants
1961-1979
7.73
6.52
6.55
4.71
7.31
6.22
1961-1968
7.042
(4.77)
5.428
(8.95)
OLS - Ordinary least squares e
t-values are given in brackets
1968-1979
7.959
(3.07)
9.090
(2.97)
stimation,
Trend
-. 027
(0.51)
-. 173
(5.21)
-. 226
(2.00)
.224
(4.49)
-. 382
(3.04)
.072
(1 .43)
-. 243
(7.81)
-. 025
(049)
-. 172
(5.19)
OLSDV - Ordinary
for the
Growth Rate
of GNP
-. 067
(0.58)
-. 049
(0.67)
-.087
(0.57)
-. 180
(3.57)
-. 005
(0.03)
.009
(0.08)
.069
(0.97)
Inflation Rate
-. 353
(1.88)
-. 545
(4.61)
-. 641
(2.42)
-. 651
(4.07)
-. 481
(1.65)
, ,I
-. 315
(1 .83)
-. 517
(4.68)
least squares method with
individual firms
.2904
.4641
.6588
.9517
.6999
.1229
.4058
.2744
.4629
dummy variables
I
Table 8 : Regression Coefficients, Real Rates of Return on Equity after Taxes
-Electrotechnical Industry-
Equation
Equation 1
OLS
OLSDV
Equation
Equation
2
3
Equation 4
Equation
OLS
5
0 ISDV
Equation 6
OLS
OLSDV
1961-1979
13.85
11.09
12.81
9.04
13.39
12.24
OLS - Ordinary least
t-values are given in
Constants
1961-1968
10
(3
11
(6
646
52)
618
46)
1968-1979
11.757
2.21)
9.425
(3.64)
11
L ____________________ I
squares estimation, OLSDV -
brackets
Trend
-. 334
(3.68)
-. 535
(4.38)
-. 537
(2.31)
.311
(2.10)
-. 782
(7.34)
-. 374
(4.64)
-. 613
(5.63)
-. 332
(3.77)
-. 540
(4.43)
Ordinary
Growth Rate
of GNP
-. 074
(0.37)
.185
(0.69)
.029
(0.09)
-. 451
(3.02)
.567
(3.37)
-. 006
(0,03)
.317
(1.26)
least squares
for the individual firms
Inflation Rate
-. 314
(0.97)
-. 611
(1.41)
-. 305
(0.56)
-1 .382
(2.91)
.516
(2.09)
-. 271
(0.92)
-. 716
(1.76)
th dummy variables
.6136
.3359
.5994
.8909
.9408
.5892
.3292
.6100
.3343
, ,
method wi
Table 9 : Regression Coefficients, Nominal Rate of Return on Total Capital after Taxes
- Steel Industry -
Equation Constants
1961-1979 1961-1968 1969-1979
Trend Growth Rate
of GNP
Inflation Rate
________________________ 1 1 4 1 1 -- - I -
Equation 1
Equation 2
Equation 3
Equation 4
Equation
Equation
5
6
3.54
I*
3.88
4.04
5.037
(4.16)
3.686
(1.80)
7.348
(3.45)
8.682
(2.66)
-. 013
(0.23)
-. 168
(1.80)
-. 078
(0.46)
-. 209
(1.56)
.00002
(0.0005)
-.015
(0.26)
.080
(0.64)
-. 026
(0.21)
.030
(0.18)
-. 105
(0.49)
.058
(0.51)
.054
(0.29)
.010
(0.50)
-. 132
(0.61)
.143
(0.26)
-. 232
(0.74)
.3
--,054
(0.29)
.1~~~.~'~
.0333
.2472
.1114
.2871
.0174
.0065
t-values are given in brackets
Nominal Rate of Return on Equity after Taxes
- Steel Industry -
Equation
Equation 1
Equation 2
Equation 3
Equation 4
Equation 5
Equation 6
I 1961-1979
4.37
5.30
7.43
Constants
1961-1968
8.990
(2.55)
6.235
(1.24)
1969-1979
16.136
(2.60)
20.26
(2.04)
I.
Trend
-. 251
(1.50)
-. 729
(2.69)
-. 649
(1.57)
-. 817
(2.00)
-. 215
(1.48)
-. 262
(1.54)
Growth Rate
of GNP
.491
(1 .34)
/
.164
(0.45)
.461
(1.11)
-. 165
(0.26)
.430
(1.29)
Inflation Rate
.280
(0.47)
-. 439
(0.69)
.010
(0.008)
-. 805
(0.85)
.0007
(0.001)
L _______________________ I _____________________ 1 .1
t-values are given in brackets
.2550
.4361
.5514
.4350
.2440
-1657
Table 1o: Regression Coefficients,
Return on Total Capital after
- Steel Industry -
Equation
Equation 1
OLSDV
Equation 2
Equation
Equation
Equation
OLS
3
4
5
OISDV
Equation
OLS
6
OLSDV
1961-1979
7.06
4.74
5.88
2.74
6.57
4.34
Constants
1961-1968
5.616
(5.84)
3.478
(1.82)
,
OLS - Ordinary least squares estimation,
t-values are given in brackets
Trend
1968-1979
7.218
(4.26)
9.380
(4.54)
-. 047
(1.03)
-. 132
(3.51)
.0004
(0.009)
-. 053
(1 .33)_
Growth Rate
of GNP
-. 079
(0.78)
-. 065
(0.74)
-. 124
(1.25)
-. 015
(0.09)
-. 271
(2.02)
-. 002
(0.02)
.065
(0.75)
Inflation Rate
-. 353
(2.17)
-. 601
(4.21)
-. 758
(4.40)
-. 277
(0.55)
-. 951
(4.84)
-. 308
(2.04)
-. 564
(4 .22)
OLSDV - Ordinary l east squtares mthod with dummy variables
for the individual firms
.2881
.3265
.7168
.0785
.8039
.0655
.2515
.2591
.3242
-. 001
(0.03)
-. 055
(1.37)
-. 157
(2.13)
-. 059
(0.38)
-. 209
(2.47)
Regressionl Coef ficients, Real Rate ofTable 11: Taxes
Rates of Return on Equity after Taxes
- Steel Industry -
Equation 1
Equation 1
OLS
OLSDV
Equation 2
q
Equation 3
Equation 4
Equation 5
OLS
OISDV
Equation 6
OLS
OLSDV
1961-1979
Constants I
1961-1968
* -I
8.72
3.03
9.30
3.27
9.77
4.98
OLS - Ordinary least
1968-1979
8.778
(2.16)
5.291
(2.29)
3.753
(0.95)
squares estimation,
.070
1.77)
,
11
(
Trend
-. 313
(3.97)
-. 302
(3.69)
-. 541
(3.05)
-. 474
(1.46)
-. 598
(2.32)
-. 291
(4.23)
-. 293
(4.03)
-. 317
(4.03)
-. 310
(3.76)
Growth Rate
of GNP
.169
(0.98)
.316
(1.76)
.169
(0.71)
.326
(1.00)
-. 004
(0.01)
.132
(0.83)
.300
(1.79)
OLSDV - Ordinary least squarer
for the individual firm
Inflation Rate
-I----
.173
(0.62)
.074
(0.25)
-. 277
(0.67)
-. 053
(0.05)
.464
(0.78)
.076
(0.29)
-. 106
(0.38)
.5867
.2375
.5928
.5054
.5297
.5762
.2372
.5604
.2227
method with dummy variablest-values are given in brackets
,, ,
Table 12: Regression Coefficients, Real
R
Regression Coefficients, Nominal Rate of Return on Total Capital after Taxes
- Machinery Industry -
Equa tion
Equation
Equation
Equation
1
2
3
Equation 4
Equation
Equation
5
6
Constants
1961-1979
4.44
5.13
4.35
1961-1968
5.16
(9.21)
5.656
(5.27)
1969-1979
6.282
(6.37)
6.325
(5.24)
Trend
-. 122
(4.62)
-. 197
(4.58)
-. 147
(1.66)
-. 225
(4.53)
-. 095
(3.62)
-. 122
(4.76)
Growth Rate
of GNP
-. 013
(0.23)
-.065
(1 .12)
-. 056
(0.63)
-. 051
(0.65)
-. 059
(0.96)
Inflation Rate
.209
(2.23)
.096
(0.96)
-. 197
(0.70)
.160
(1.39)
.216
(2.54)
t-values are given in brackets
.5874
.6858
.4177
.8026
.4510
.5859
Ta ble. 13:
Regression Coefficients, Nominal Rate of Return on Equity after Taxes
- Machinery Industry -
Equation Constants Trend Growth Rate Inflation Rate R
2
1961-1979 1961-1968 1969-1979 of GNP
Equation 1 12.41 ----- -. 376 .084 -. 295 .7867
(5.47) (0.56) (1.21)
Equation 2 13.90 16.20 -. 531 -.021 -. 527 .8183
(9.00) (5.97) (4.47) (0.13) (1.90)
Equation 3 15.368 -.516 -.149 -.915 .4889
(4.67) (1.90) (0.55) (1.05)
Equation 4 ----- 14.456 -. 516 .135 -. 318 .7592
(4.10) (3.56) (0.59) (0.95)
Equation 5 11.42 --. 414 .148 ----- .7660
(6.67) (1.03)
Equation 6 12.93 ----- -. 378 ----- -. 343 .7823
(5.63) (1.53)
t-values are given in brackets
Table 14:
Regression Coefficients, Real Rate of Return on Total Capital after Taxes
- Machinery Industry -
Equation
Equation 1
OLS
OLSDV
Equation 2
Equation 3
Equation 4
Equation 5
OLS
OISDV
Equation 6
OLS
OLSDV
1961-1979
7.55
4.00
2.63
3.21
6.61
4.16
OLS - Ordinary least
Constants
1961-1968
5.496
(5.62)
5.352
(3.48)
6.566
(3.82)
7.189
(3.76)
r
squares estimation, OLSDV -
t-values are given in brackets
4.
(4
.
-. 1
(5.(
- 9
(2
)
)
.0.
-. 058
(0.46)
-. 287
(2.97)
.305
(2.20)
-. 205
(6.66)
.497
(4.25)
-. 175
(5.09)
-. 150
(0.57)
.025
(0.33),
-. 112
(1.11)
-. 104
(0.81)
-. 105
(0.69)
.170
(0.53)
.076
(1.07)
-1.480
(3.47)
-. 237
(1.94)
-. 498
(2.84)
-. 735
(1.81)
-. 429
(1 '.92)
-1.391
(3.57)
-. 251
(2.19)
Ordinary least squares method with
for the individual firms
.5741
.2017
.7366
.4962
.6550
.2320
.1957
.5648
.2015
dummy variables
Tab le 15 :
Regression Coefficients, Real Rates of Return on Equity after Taxes
- Machinery Industry -
Equation
Equation
OLS
1
OLSDV
Equation
Equation
Equation
Equation
OLS
2
3
4
5
OISDV
Equation 6
OLS
OLSDV
Constants
1961-1979
13.53
6.80
p
10.34
6.86
12.58
7.28
1961-1968
10
(6
11
(3
.374
.59)
.928
.86)
1968-1979
11
(4
.416
.12)
9.738
(2.91)
F
1~'
Trend
-. 181
(3.42)
-. 486
(5.57)
-. 480
(3.97)
-. 360
(1.41)
-. 504
(3.67)
-. 303
(4.03)
-. 484
(6.23)
(3
(5
177
.29)
4 .88
.60)
Growth Rate
of GNP
-. 152
(1.31)
.076
(0.40)
-.077
(0.47)
-. 229
(0.89)
.114
(0.52)
.056
(0.32)
.072
(0.40)
Inflation Rate
-. 958
(5.11)
.017
(0.05)
-. 700
(2.48)
-1.264
(1.55)
-. 414
(1.30
-. 872
(4.86)
- .026
(0.09)
.8293
.1759
.8532
.4811
.7769
.5318
.1759
.8097
.1756
a i I-.-... L L ________________________________ i
OLS - Ordinary least squares estimation, OTSDV - Ordinary
t-values are gLven in brackets for the
least sqiares; method with dummy varlablesr,
individual firms
Table 16 :
I
--------- -
Appendix 6: Time Series of Exogenous Variables
Growth Rate in Percent
Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Vriable
Price for Raw 2.oo 1.96 7.79 3o.24 1.37 4.o5 1.65 1.90 6.23
Materials
Wages and 11.oo 8.92 lo.42 10.19 7.89 6.36 7.11 5.31 5.78
Salaries
Demand(real) 2.86 3.19 3.ol - .3o -2.57 2.64 2.8o 3.5o 4.5o
Price of Product 2.95 3.22 6.o7 12.74 4.4o 4.28 1.35 1.94 3.94
Price of Invest- 7.9o 3.71 4.56 9.o6 8.62 4.33 4.15 2.99 3.42
ment Goods
Interest Rate on 8.5o 8.4o 10.00 11.oo 8.9o 8.oo 7.oo 6.8o 7.80
Long-Term Debt*
Cost of Equity* 13.5o 13.10 13.oo 13.8o 13.70 12.80 13.10 13.6o 13.7o
Other Expenditures 9.98 -1.24 17.3o 17.63 -1.35 8.41 8.13 6.41 6.99
and Marketing Exp.
Actual Interest 3.9 3.4 3.7 3.9 3.5 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.5
Payment on Debt* 3
* absolute values
